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Abstract 
The aim of this master’s thesis is to present an argument for basing the moral value of 
informational privacy on an informational concept of personhood. Conventional liberal 
accounts of privacy, basing the moral value of informational privacy solely on the value of 
autonomy, will be shown insufficient in providing adequate rights to informational privacy in 
a digital age. I argue that in order to ascribe moral status to personal information, and through 
this status, informational privacy rights to individuals within the digital informational 
environment, the moral value of informational privacy must be based on the direct value of 
personal information. That is, rights to informational privacy are to be based on the 
constitutive role of personal information in making up and sustaining the informational 
person.   
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1 Introduction 
This thesis considers the moral foundation for informational privacy rights. I will argue that 
developments in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) have left the 
traditional liberal conception of personhood (as autonomy) inadequate in generating rights to 
informational privacy that are sufficient in providing protection of personal information in an 
age of digitalization. Rather than basing rights to informational privacy solely on a 
conception of persons as self-determined, autonomous agents, by virtue of which the 
individual is entitled to a normative ability to control access to her own personal information; 
I will argue that what is required for robust informational privacy rights, is a concept of 
personhood that recognizes the informational nature of persons to the effect of establishing 
the direct value of personal information. By establishing the direct value of personal 
information, the moral status ascribed to persons will be extended to personal information 
and personal information as such has a claim on others’ respect. This in turn, places moral 
constraints on behaviour towards personal information.     
 Accounts of privacy have been many, various, and rivalrous. The liberal account of 
privacy is intuitive. Here traditionally, the individual’s moral claim to privacy is based on the 
fundamental value of the autonomy of the individual. According to this view, rights to 
privacy are the individual’s right to control others’ access to herself. The liberal conception 
of privacy arises from a conception of the person as an autonomous agent, originating from 
the Cartesian world-view, according to which “no one can really know the thoughts and 
feelings of another person” (Alfino and Mayes, 2003 p. 11). By this account I have a direct 
knowledge of what is in and on my own mind, whereas others can only have knowledge 
about what is in or on my mind indirectly, that is, by me providing others with the relevant 
information. What is being assumed is the subject’s privileged (epistemic) position when it 
comes to knowing the content of her own mind. That is, we are granted first-person authority 
when it comes to our own self-knowledge (McGeer, 1996, pp. 483-484). This essential first-
person authority (or inscrutability) guarantees our individuality and our immunity to control 
by others (Alfino and Mayes, 2003 p. 11). Thus, in the liberal tradition, the person’s right to 
control others’ access to herself, or in other words, the person’s right to privacy, is typically 
justified in terms of her nature as an autonomous agent. Privacy is taken as protecting the 
condition or property of being a person (Solove, 2009, pp. 29-30), and the value of privacy 
“[…] consist(s) of adhering to a moral duty to respect each individual’s dignity and 
autonomy” (Solove, 2009, p. 85). Rössler for instance, suggests that “[s]omething is private if 
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one can oneself control access to this ‘something’” (Rössler, 2005, p. 8), and privacy is 
important because it protects the autonomy of the person (Rössler, 2005).    
 Since it is common to distinguish between three kinds of privacy:  
 
(i)  Physical privacy = def. S’ freedom from sensory interference or intrusion, achieved 
thanks to a restriction on others’ ability to have bodily interactions with S. (Floridi, 
1999, p. 52).  
 
(ii)  Decisional privacy = def. S’ freedom from procedural interference or intrusion, 
achieved thanks to the exclusion of others from decisions (concerning e.g. education, 
health care, career, work, marriage, faith) taken by S and S’ group of intimates 
(Floridi, 1999, p. 52).  
 
(iii)  Informational privacy = def. S’ freedom from epistemic interference or intrusion, 
achieved thanks to a restriction on facts about S that are unknown or unknowable 
(Floridi, 1999, p. 52); 
 
it will be appropriate, in this thesis, to limit the discussion to informational privacy, since the 
concern is the impact on informational privacy of the individual by new ICTs.  
 According to Benn (1988, p. 288) informational privacy, i.e. having control over 
access to personal information, is important in order to protect autonomy in one’s self-
presentation. That is, violations of informational privacy will “[…] impair one’s capacity to 
manage the complex system of appearances with which one confronts the world” (Benn, 
1988, p. 288). Similarly, Rössler (2005, p. 116) argues that informational privacy is important 
because having control over how we present ourselves to others is an intrinsic element in 
conceiving ourselves as autonomous individuals. Personal information is accordingly worthy 
of protection in contexts where unauthorized external access to such information jeopardizes 
the autonomy in self-presentation of the person in question (Rössler, 2005, pp. 124-125). 
 Concern about informational privacy has a tendency to emerge when assessing 
problems involved in or arising from changes in human interaction and communication 
patterns, such as those caused by developments in ICTs. For instance, one of the early 
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definitions of privacy1 as “the right to be let alone” was expressed due to concerns about 
technological developments that threatened to cause disruptions of established patterns of 
communication and interaction. In 1890 Warren and Brandeis stated that “[i]nstantaneous 
photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and 
domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the predication that 
“what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the housetops”” (Warren and 
Brandeis, 1984, p. 76). This technological development has now developed into what, of 
some at least, is considered an information revolution. Solove, for instance, points to an 
“information revolution” that he describes in terms of a […] dramatic transformation of the 
way we shop, bank, and go about our daily business–changes that have resulted in an 
unprecedented proliferation of records and data” (2004, p. 1). Privacy concerns are no longer 
foremost that of having one’s intimate personal information “proclaimed from the rooftops”, 
but that of having “[…] the minutia of our everyday comings and goings, of our likes and 
dislikes, of who we are and what we own [preserved in] the collective computer networks of 
the world” (Solove, 2004, p. 1, my insertion), to the effect of digital “copies” or 
reconstructions of the “natural” person being created and manipulated by external parties in 
order to serve their particular interests.        
 The “information revolution” is taken a step further with the emergence of ubiquitous 
computing where the “digital” person is no longer only a digital reconstruction of a person’s 
life, but the “natural” person is digitalized and incorporated into a computer network. 
According to Conti, et al., by ubiquitous or pervasive computing “[…] real-world 
components interact with cyberspace via sensing, computing and communication elements, 
thus driving towards what is called the Cyber–Physical World (CPW) convergence” (2012, p. 
2, italics in the original). This means that the “natural” (i.e. “physical” or “concrete”) person 
can be integrated in a computer network by virtue of (personal) information being seamless 
transferred into a digital informational environment where this information is “[…] 
elaborated to adapt cyber applications and services to the physical context […]” (Conti, et al., 
2012, p. 2). With the CPW convergence ‘things’ become active participants in information 
processes, and by exchanging data and information sensed about the environment, they can 
communicate with each other and the environment, react independently to the communicated 
information, and influence it by running processes that trigger action with or without human 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Warren and Brandeis in The Right to Privacy: The Implicit Made Explicit (1984) tie the value of privacy with 
the individual’s “right to be left alone” (Warren and Brandeis, 1890, in Schoeman, 1984, p. 14). 
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intervention (Gubbi, et al., 2013, p. 1647). For instance, a person with a heart disease can be 
fitted with an electronic cardiac device, such as a wireless implantable cardioverter-
defibrillator (ICD). Such a device can store and communicate information of the patient’s 
heart rhythm to medical staff so that they in turn can adjust the device accordingly in order to 
treat potentially fatal heart rhythms. However, by integrating the patient by means of the 
wireless ICD into a computer network, the patient is vulnerable to external improper 
modifications or manipulations in that unauthorized external parties could wirelessly 
communicate with the ICD to modify its settings and by this, not only gain knowledge of 
personal information, but cause the devise to issue a large shock (Denning et al, 2010, pp. 
917-918). By this, the person itself can be altered or manipulated improperly by external 
information processing powers. Any inhabitants (or entities) integrated into such an 
environment are thus (sets of) information that can be operated on by information processing 
powers, leaving the person, like any other entity, constitutively made up of (personal) 
information.            
 The concern of this thesis is that this constitutive role of personal information is not 
reflected in traditional liberal accounts of informational privacy. Traditional liberal accounts 
consider personal information as knowledge about the particular person in question, the right 
to informational privacy is the individual’s right to control others’ knowledge about herself in 
contexts where such knowledge undermines her autonomy in self-presentation. By this, 
personal information is indirectly valuable on the condition of the value of autonomy, 
personal information as such having no particular moral value.    
 Traditional liberal accounts of privacy have been critiqued in various ways. 
Schoeman (1992), for instance, objects to basing the value of privacy on autonomy. He argue 
that autonomy suggests isolation, leaving privacy as “restrictions on others’ access to a 
person,” whereas privacy suggests involvement and intimacy, and enables individuals to form 
deep and meaningful relationships with family and friends. It is this associational aspect, 
according to Schoeman, that should be taken as the source of its value (1992, pp. 156-157). 
In this thesis the intention is not to reject the liberal concept of privacy on grounds that it is 
anti-associational, neither is it to question the value of autonomy as such, it is rather to 
express a concern over the value of autonomy as insufficient in providing needed restrictions 
on others’ access to a person in a technologically advanced world.    
 I will argue that by conceiving the person as information, the information that is to be 
considered as worthy of protection by informational privacy rights is not to be determined on 
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condition of autonomy but by its constitutive role. By virtue of its constitutive role, personal 
information has direct value in relation to what it is constitutive of, that is, it has a direct 
value in relation to the set of which it is a member. Or, put differently, personal information 
is of direct value to the person it is a constitutive part of. By recognizing the direct value of 
personal information, by recognizing its constitutive role, the moral value ascribed the 
“natural” person can be extended to personal information. By this, the value of informational 
privacy is not to be considered as consisting in adhering to a moral duty to respect each 
individual’s autonomy, but as consisting in adhering to a moral duty to respect personal 
information as such. I will claim that an informational conception of personhood will provide 
individuals with more robust rights to informational privacy, within a (digital) environment 
where both the entities inhabiting it and their patterns of interaction and communication are 
drastically different from those upon which the liberal theories traditionally are based, and 
the person’s ability to control access is in effect limited to a choice in whether or not to 
partake in digital living (to the degree this is a choice).      
 In the next chapter I will first introduce the theories of Benn (1988) and Rössler 
(2005), that I take as representative of the traditional liberal conception of privacy, defining 
privacy rights as protection of autonomy. I will then discuss some difficulties facing these 
theories in relation to developments in Information and Communication Technology (ICT). 
In Chapter 3, as a preliminary for determining the moral criterion for informational privacy 
rights, I will give an outline of Floridi’s (2011) account of the informational person, 
introduce the person as a unique set of information and suggest personhood as a particular 
degree of informational detachment. In Chapter 4, I will develop the moral criterion for 
informational privacy rights. I will argue for extending the moral status ascribed the “natural” 
person to the informational person to the effect of attributing moral status to personal 
information. I will defend the direct moral value of personal information as the criterion for 
informational privacy rights.   
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2 Privacy and the Liberal Conception of 
Personhood as Autonomy 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, in thesis I will argue that by our extensive adoption of new ICTs 
(developed by computer scientists and engineers), the ways in which we interact will be 
subject to fundamental changes to the effect of a need for a re-conceptualization of who we 
are. When such a re-conceptualization is in place, a new account of the moral value of 
personal information, one that will generate more adequate informational privacy rights, will 
be available. In preparation for such an account I will in this chapter consider two influential 
liberal theories on privacy that I take as representative of the prevalent or common (liberal) 
views on privacy and privacy rights, namely those of Benn (1988) and Rössler (2005). I will 
in the following section give an outline of these two theories, then, in section 2.2 I will turn 
my focus to informational privacy, and I will touch upon some problems faced by theories 
that conceive of personhood in terms of autonomy when arguing for the right to 
informational privacy (this will also be further discussed in later chapters).   
  
 
2.1 The Traditional Liberal Conception of the Value of 
Privacy 
In this section I will give an outline of the liberal theories of privacy of Benn (1988) and 
Rössler (2005) as a foundation for the upcoming discussion. I have chosen these theories 
because they are in line with the view I initially intended to defend, namely that rights to 
privacy are due us because of our nature as autonomous, self-determined agents. Benn (1988) 
argues that privacy is necessary in order to respect persons as choosers. Rössler (2005), on 
the other hand, argues that we value privacy because we value autonomy, that is, without the 
protection of privacy, a life led autonomously would not be possible. Although Rössler 
(2005, p. 71) accuses Benn (1988) of becoming reductive in his approach to privacy, this 
debate is not of concern here, what is essential is that they both base privacy, in some way or 
other, on the value of autonomy. I have included both in order to enrich the argument in the 
following chapters. I will begin by giving an introduction of Benn’s (1988) view on privacy 
and then turn to Rössler (2005).        
 According to Benn, since a person knows himself as thinking and feeling, and 
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because this consciousness of inwards processes itself can be the intentional object of thought 
and feeling, to be conscious of oneself as a natural person is to believe that one’s conscious 
processes are causally effective, that is, to believe that what makes the difference to the world 
is one’s deciding (Benn, 1988, p. 92). This means, according to Benn, that “[t]he actions of a 
person are the effects of his having beliefs and recognizing, even if sometimes inadequately, 
what they commit him to do” (Benn, 1988, p. 92). For someone to be a natural person is, 
accordingly, to be aware of oneself as a decision maker or chooser whose decisions can make 
a change to how the world goes (Benn, 1988, pp. 90-94).      
 By recognizing oneself as a chooser or a natural person (that is by seeing oneself as a 
project maker) in a world with others like oneself, a conception of oneself as a moral person 
is developed. By being conceptually equipped to grasp what it is to have and value projects of 
his own, a natural person is thereby committed to respecting every other person as an 
originator of projects. By claiming respect, that is, the recognition of our moral personality on 
the grounds of our natural personality, we are committed to extending it to anyone else 
satisfying the same conditions (Benn, 1988, p. 94-99). This principle of respect presupposes a 
certain minimal equality since “[…] it is grounded in the fact that each speaks from his own 
particular point of view, having perceived interests that no one else can presume to know in 
advance of inquiry, and which cannot be assumed to be interchangeable with anyone else’s” 
(Benn, 1988, pp. 104-105). Respect for persons is therefore due to all persons alike, and is 
“[…] to see him as a subject for a principle of equal consideration of interests […]” (Benn, 
1988, p. 106). The relating interests are, not only the things that would be, or believed by the 
person to be, to his advantage, but also the elements that form the person’s identity over time 
in that they are the forms of activities that he perceives as giving points to his actions and 
projects. Through his identity of interests the person is then able to see continuity of meaning 
and pattern in what he is and does (Benn, 1988, pp. 106-107).  
 
His projects are an exteriorization of himself, projections, indeed, of himself into the 
world; his identity as a person […] depends on his sense that they are indeed his own, 
informed by interests which together constitute him an intentional agent with an 
enduring nature, not simply as a stream of experiences, even of remembered and 
envisaged experiences” (Benn, 1988, p. 107).   
 
We have a moral claim to privacy, according to Benn, because others’ observations or 
scrutiny of us has impact on our decision-making. By being observed, that is, by finding 
himself as the focus of the observer’s attention, the agent will change his perception of his 
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own actions in that the agent will see his actions through the eyes of the observer (Benn, 
1988, pp. 272-273). Accordingly, Benn views the normative aspect or dimension of privacy 
as respect for individuals as choosers: 
                              
I am suggesting that a general principle of privacy might be grounded on the more 
general principle of respect for persons […] To conceive someone as a person is to 
see him as actually or potentially a chooser, as one attempting to steer his own course 
through the world, adjusting his behavior as his appreciation of the world changes, 
and correcting course as he perceives his errors. […] To respect someone as a person 
is to concede that one ought to take account of the way in which his enterprise might 
be affected by one’s own decisions. By the principle of respect for persons, then, I 
mean the principle that every human being, insofar as he is qualified as a person, is 
entitled to this minimal degree of consideration (Benn, 1984, pp. 228-229, italics in 
the original).  
                     
The moral claim to privacy, however, seems to cause tension in relation to the liberal 
principle of non-interference. This principle arises from assuming that the rationality 
conditions that a decision maker must satisfy in order to be considered a subject for respect, 
are satisfied if the person is capable of assessing possible courses of action in terms of their 
outcomes, weighing cost against benefits, and of arriving at a decision on the basis of an 
ordered set of preferences, and, of forming his beliefs on evidence and to suit his actions to 
his beliefs. When, however, a person is made un-free to act these conditions are usually 
affected, actually or possibly, by someone’s interference (Benn, 1988, pp. 152-154).  The 
principle of non-interference thus ascribes “[…] a general liberty to do whatever one chooses 
unless someone else has good grounds to interfere to prevent it, grounds that would appeal to 
any rational person” (Benn, 1988, p. 271), The burdens of justification by this principle will 
always fall on the interferer, not on the person interfered with (Benn, 1988, p. 87). Privacy 
rights, as rights to limit or control others’ access to physical, mental, or informational 
spheres, initially seem contradictory to the principle of non-interference. Privacy claims will 
restrain the observer’s action of observing, and by that interfere with the observer’s liberty to 
do whatever he chooses. In the case of privacy violations, however, the observer will, by his 
mere presence, restrain the agent’s actions, to the effect that the observer has violated the 
agent’s status as a chooser (that is, his status as a natural and moral person). By this violation, 
the agent (the observed) will have a moral claim, on the observer, of immunity to observation 
if the agent satisfies the conditions for natural personhood. Benn, therefore, argues that the 
certain basic features of our conception of a person requires some minimal right to immunity 
from uninvited observation and reporting (Benn, 1984, p. 224). In noting that privacy 
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amounts to respect for persons as choosers, Benn takes it that privacy protects personhood 
because observation (or surveillance) restricts an individual’s range of choices to the effect of 
a limitation on the individual’s freedom (Solove, 2009, p. 30).    
 According to Rössler, a person would not be described as free if she acted in the pure 
freedom of the chooser, making her choices ‘only’ freely, arbitrarily, without reason. Her 
choices must be grounded or determined by a certain attitude towards herself and towards 
possible options. This attitude is the attitude that the person has toward her own life or life 
projects. The person must therefore be able to ask herself the “practical question” relating to 
how she would like to live, what sort of person she wants to be, and how she should best 
strive for her own good in her own way. The capability to ask and follow through the 
practical question presupposes freedom, but this kind of freedom requires personal autonomy. 
According to Rössler, it is a fact that a life led autonomously seems ‘more valuable’ than a 
merely free life (i.e. an unconsidered life) and this is why we expect autonomy from persons 
in their actions. The possibility of asking ourselves the practical question, however, can be 
understood as the extent to which we have the possibility to distance ourselves somehow 
from our desires, the roles in which we find ourselves, and our guiding norms, and ask what 
oneself is in all this, and what it is that I myself want? And this results, in Rössler’s view, in 
the possibility of behaving reflectively with respect to one’s own life. Personal autonomy is, 
accordingly, general personal self-determination concerning how one wants to lead one’s life. 
What makes general personal self-determination or the autonomously led life possible, is the 
moral respect for a person’s autonomy. Individual personal autonomy is therefore, according 
to Rössler, only possible within a social network which recognises and acknowledges moral 
norms such as respect, fairness and tolerance (Rössler, 2005, pp. 49-51).    
 To be self-determined or autonomous, according to Rössler, means that the person 
can identify with her desires and actions as her own. This amounts to her desires and actions 
being authentically hers. In order for this to be, she must be able, and be in a position to 
reflect upon her desires, and by such reflection decide on whether to accept, reject or modify 
them. Authenticity is expressed in terms of “evaluative identification” as opposed to 
“confirmatory identification” (Rössler, 2005, p. 53). The goal of evaluative identification is 
“[…] to be able to choose between different desires, possible modes of behaviour and ways 
of life in such a way that an autonomous decision is the result” (Rössler, 2005, p. 53). This 
means that if a person’s actions were to be exclusively guided by convention and other 
persons’ preferences, without any evaluations of her own, she would not be considered 
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autonomous (Rössler, 2005, p. 53).  I take it that confirmatory identification, on the other 
hand, would be when a person accepts and identifies with any desire whatsoever, the person 
would identify or confirm the desire as her own, but this identification would not be based 
upon a critical process which is a condition for autonomy (Rössler, 2005, p. 54).  
 Because the process of reflection and identification will always incorporate personal 
obligations, feelings, memories, and biographical influences, a person’s reasons for 
identifying “good reasons”, need not seem like good reasons to other people, it would 
therefore, in Rössler’s view, be inappropriate to bind autonomy to a strong notion of 
rationality. A person is autonomous, when she has her own good reasons for identifying with 
certain desires and rejecting others, when she is able to understand herself as the author of 
that action (this, however, need not mean that other people also accept these reasons). A 
person must also be guided by true opinions about the world and her relations to other 
persons, and by true, valid opinions about herself, her own abilities and her own history. 
According to Rössler, because there is a historical component in the concept of autonomy, a 
desire could come about as a product of manipulation even though the desire fulfils the 
requirements of authenticity. This means that authentic identification is not always or 
necessarily sufficient to show the person in question as genuinely autonomous. It is therefore 
necessary to reflect on the genesis of a desire or action, especially with respect to the person’s 
individual capacity for developing a non-manipulative relationship towards herself, to decide 
on the authenticity of a respective desire or action. This means that reflection on what 
subjective context the desire or action was formed in, is necessary to prevent (as far as 
possible) self-deception and manipulations. Personal autonomy necessitates also non-
manipulative outwards circumstances in that non-manipulative social relations allow the 
person to build upon forms of recognition that are intrinsic to the development of a non-
manipulative self-relationship  (Rössler, 2005, pp. 54-61).  
 
A non-autonomous life in this external sense would thus be one that is lived under 
conditions that (necessarily) bring the person to form systematically false opinions – 
at least in certain respects – about her possibilities, actions, goals, desires and 
expectations, that is conditions of systematic repression, manipulation and deception 
(Rössler, 2005, p. 61). 
 
A constituent element of the development of individual autonomy is therefore a social or 
relational element because persons are dependent on inter-subjective communication that 
conveys to them that their own self-identification or identity is taken seriously. Through this, 
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the person can gain self-respect (Rössler, 2005, p. 62). The degree of successful inter-
subjective communication depends, however, on the way others are involved in one’s affairs. 
How particular standpoints are involved in a communication or how their degree of 
involvement influences a person’s self-perception (as an autonomous subject), how she acts 
and how she presents herself (Rössler, 2005, pp. 116-117). Because we are influenced by the 
presence of others, other’s privacy should be respected when we realise that our behaviour 
may influence their self-perception and behaviour in undesired ways (Rössler, 2005, p. 117). 
Privacy has therefore, according to Rössler, the function of permitting and protecting 
autonomous lives in that “[r]espect for a person’s privacy is respect for her as an autonomous 
subject” (2005, p. 117). Our reasons, according to Rössler, for wanting ‘a room of our own’ 
or for wanting to be able to control what others know about our private life is that 
 
To be able to ask oneself authentically why one is and how one would like to live, it is 
clearly necessary to have possibilities for withdrawing from the gaze of other people. 
To be able to conceive, develop and pursue goals, it is necessary to have dimensions 
in one’s life that are free from the objections and control of other people. To be able 
to develop authentic plans, to design or define oneself through one’s dealings with 
‘specified others’ one’s expectations with respect to other people’s knowledge about 
oneself must not be mistaken (2005, p. 73).    
 
Rössler claims the distinction between a public and private realm as constitutive because it 
expresses the fundamental notion of individual freedom and the autonomy of the person, her 
thesis being that “[…] the true realization of freedom, that is a life led autonomously, is only 
possible in conditions where privacy is protected” (2005, p. 72).    
 According to Rössler, in the liberal view of privacy, “[…] something is regarded as 
private if one can oneself control access to this ‘something’” (2005, p. 71). On this notion of 
privacy the protection of privacy denotes protection from undesired access by others. By this, 
a person have a right, by virtue of her autonomy, to be able to control access to particular 
places (such as her room or home (Rössler, 2005, p. 71)), a right to control “[…] who has 
access in the form of opportunities to intervene or intrude in decisions relevant to the person 
herself or in actions not directly concerning others” (Rössler, 2005, p. 71), as well as having a 
right to have control over who has access to which knowledge about herself, i.e. control over 
who knows what (relevant) data about her (Rössler, 2005, p. 71). As mentioned in Chapter 1, 
this thesis will concern this last kind of privacy rights, that is, with individuals’ rights to 
informational privacy.   
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2.2 Informational Privacy, Self-Knowledge and 
Autonomy 
In this section I will account for informational privacy in relation to the value of autonomy. I 
will briefly consider some difficulties facing the liberal accounts of informational privacy, 
and (although somewhat superficially) argue that by basing their accounts on autonomy to the 
effect of generating control rights to informational privacy, they neither capture the severity 
of informational privacy violations, nor are they sufficient in view of evolving technologies. I 
will then anticipate a solution that involves a unification of the person with her information 
that will allow the moral status ascribed the former to be extended to include the latter. 
 Benn’s view on informational privacy is that a person should be able to “[…] prevent 
unauthorized access to facts about oneself that ‘give one away’ – that if freely available 
would impair one’s capacity to manage the complex system of appearances with which one 
confronts the world” (Benn, 1988, p. 288). According to Benn, when publicized, private 
information will have a tendency to be fixed as public, objective facts, and this forces us to 
see ourselves as others see us. This, however, does not necessarily make us see ourselves 
more truly, but it may, nevertheless, alter our own self-perception: “[…] the eye of the voyeur 
can impose its soiled vision on the self-consciousness of its object, to affront and spoil what it 
sees” (Benn, 1988, p. 288, original italics). We should therefore be able to control access to 
such information.         
 Informational privacy, according to Rössler, implies limits to knowledge. “If privacy 
in general means being able to control ‘access’ to one’s personhood, then […] this must in 
one respect be understood and interpreted as control over what other people can know about 
oneself” (2005, p. 111, italics in the original). According to Rössler, ‘control’ means control 
over who knows what about a person and how they know it, i.e. “ control of the information 
relating to that person” (2005, p. 111). Similarly to Benn, Rössler argues that informational 
privacy matters to us because we see it as an intrinsic part of our self- understanding, as 
autonomous or self-determinate (autarchic2 or self-directing in Benn’s terms) individuals, to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 On Benn’s account, being autarchic is to be a decision-making subject, satisfying the minimum conditions of 
rationality mentioned above. Autarchy is thus “the normal state of the natural person” (Benn, 1988, p. 184). To 
be autonomous, on the other hand, is “to live according to a law that one prescribes to oneself” (Benn, 1988, p. 
155), and goes beyond autarchy in that autonomy is an ideal for the autarchic person to strive for and which can 
be achieved in varying degrees. According to Benn, however, a human being is not defective either as a human 
or as a person because of falling short of autonomy, only by falling short of autarchy is a human being 
considered defective as a human or person (Benn, 1988, pp. 154-155).   
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have control over our self-presentation. According to Rössler, if we lose the ability to control 
how we want to present or stage ourselves and to whom and in which contexts we want to do 
so, we would no longer be able to regulate the range of our diverse social relations. Without 
self-determined control over what one allows to be known about oneself and by whom this 
information about oneself is to be known, neither self-determined, context-dependent, or 
authentic behaviour would be possible, nor would one be able to authentically (or 
autonomously) find an answer to the practical question (Rössler, 2005, p. 116). This is 
because 
 
[t]he very moment the deceived person becomes aware of the situation, the presence 
of observers, the knowledge of unexpected third parties, or the deception on the part 
of actual communication partners always results in a change or shift in perspective. 
And it is just such an involuntary shift in perspective from the first to the third person 
that prevents self-determined, authentic behaviour […] (Rössler, 2005, p. 116). 
 
As previously mentioned, traditional liberal theories of privacy as protection of autonomy 
originate from the internalistic (Cartesian) view of the mind, which is that “no one can really 
know the thoughts and feelings of another person, that is, we have first-person authority 
when it comes to our own self-knowledge. This essential inscrutability, which was supposed 
to guarantee our individuality or identity and our immunity to control by others, must, 
however - with the realization that there is no metaphysical boundary between mind and 
body, we are prone to others knowing and (to some extent) controlling our thoughts and 
feelings - be rejected on philosophical and scientific grounds. (Alfino and Mayes, 2003, p.11-
12). Ryle, for instance argued that:  
 
The superiority of the speaker’s knowledge of what he’s doing over that of the 
listener does not indicate that he has privileged access to facts of a type inevitable 
inaccessible to the listener, but only that he is in a very good position to know what 
the listener is often in a very poor position to know (1984, pp. 155-156).  
 
McGeer seems to think that, although we might gain information about ourselves by different 
means than the means by which others gain information about us, the information we and 
others gain about ourselves are of the same kind, the difference being that of amount. We 
have first-person authority over ourselves because our judgements about ourselves are based 
on more of the same kind of information available to others (McGeer, 1996, p. 500). 
However, in regards to informational privacy and new technology we might risk loosing our 
superior position to view and judge our lives; our first-person authority might be under siege. 
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Information we used to assume unknowable to others might easily, by (new) technology, 
become freely available. Wasserstrom (1984, pp. 325-326) argues that the consequences of 
the availability and easy access of enormous amounts of information about each of the 
individual members of a society provided by technology could enable others with a picture of 
one’s actions that is “[…] fantastically more detailed, accurate, and complete than the one I 
could supply from my own memory […]” (Wasserstrom, 1984, pp. 326). This scenario 
emerges as a realistic picture through the concept of a life-log, where a person’s life is being 
digitally chronicled by a continuous, detailed recording of every aspect of that person’s life 
(Allen, 2011, pp. 165-171.) Since our capacities for gathering, processing, and storing 
information is limited (Manders-Huits, 2010, p. 44) the amount of information in a life-log 
would be greater than the sum of information that would be possible to store in the 
“analogue” memory of a person (human being). This would mean that something or someone 
other than the person, whose life is logged, might be in a better position than herself to make 
judgements about her (depending on who has access to the life-log).   
 This can be further exemplified in terms of what James (1892, in Lieberman, 2012, p. 
67) viewed as, the two components of the self: the I and the ME, according to which, the self 
can be viewed as “[…] an objective person, known by a passing subjective thought and 
recognized as continuing in time” (James, 1892, quoted in Lieberman, 2012, p. 67). Self-
knowledge can be viewed, according to Lieberman, as a special file cabinet called ME. The I 
is the active part of the self: it fills the file cabinet and can later peruse its content 
(Lieberman, 2012, p. 67). When the file cabinet or the ME is understood as personal 
information and the I as the autonomous, authentic agent (in terms of Rössler) or (in Benn’s 
terms) the “natural” person, then, in light of the above argument of new ICTs, something 
other than the I could easily be in possession of a greater “ME– file cabinet” than the I that 
fills it, and privileged self-knowledge is no longer obvious.      
 The important point to be drawn from the above is that our superior position or 
privileged access to our own “file cabinets” is an essential condition for personal identity. If 
we are no longer guaranteed a superior position or privileged access to our own MEs, that is, 
to our own personal information, a moral right to informational privacy should afford such a 
superior position or privileged access. I do not think, however, that the conception of 
autonomy as personhood is sufficient to provide informational privacy rights that are 
sufficiently robust to secure our privileged access to our own personal information.  
 As mentioned above, life-logging is the continuous monitoring or recording of a 
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person’s contextual activity, “[…] where a person utilizes passive capture devices to record 
and digitalize his life” (Hernandez, et al., 2013, p. 234). In life-logging the person uses a 
wearable computer that for instance, can, by biosensors, monitor physiological changes of the 
user, and, for example, by a mobile-phone camera, can collect images from the perspective of 
the user in order to capture the events leading up to the physiological changes. The data can 
be transmitted over the Internet and Bluetooth to provide both the user and others with access 
to otherwise more or less inaccessible information of the user (Hernandez, et al., 2013). Life-
logging has potential to serve many purposes especially healthcare related purposes. For 
example: 
 
[…] some of the most prevalent and disruptive symptoms of Autism Spectrum 
Disorders (ASD) include stressful challenging behaviors (e.g., self-injury, repetitive 
behaviors) and impaired verbal communication. If teachers, therapists or family 
members could also have access to information of the internal state of people with 
ASD, they could potentially gain deeper understanding of the emotional states of the 
individual and prevent the occurrence of challenging behaviour […] long term 
physiological information could also be helpful to doctors so they can better assess 
the symptoms of their patients and make better diagnosis of chronic conditions (e.g., 
epilepsy, anxiety-disorders, depression) (Hernandez, et al., 2013, pp. 326-327).      
 
According to Hernandez, et al., the privacy of the user is maintained by the camera being 
easy to switch on and off, in order for the user to determine which situations data should or 
should not be captured (2013, p. 326). The user is thus provided with the ability to control 
others’ access to her information. When the user decides to leave the device on, however, the 
user has little control over how her information is being handled or used. How her data is 
being stored and to whom it is transmitted is not in the hands of the user but in the hands of 
those who designed or engineered the system3. When it comes to the above example, on the 
other hand, some people with autism might not even be able to control the off switch, and 
would thus have no means to control access4. Thus, it is not at all obvious that theories that 
are basing informational privacy rights on autonomy that in turn generates control rights to 
informational privacy, are sufficient in view of the challenges to informational privacy of the 
individual posed by new technology.       
 Implicit in any account of privacy that justifies informational privacy in terms of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The impact new ICTs have on our ability to control access to and use of our own personal information will be 
discussed in section 4.1. 
4 According to Benn (1988, p. 94), however, such a person might not qualify as right holders of informational 
privacy, this will be briefly discussed shortly.  
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autonomy to the effect of informational privacy rights being rights to control access to 
personal information, is, in my opinion, a division between personal information and the 
“person”. When informational privacy is considered as control rights, informational privacy 
seems to entail ownership, that is, personal information seems to be considered only as a 
product produced by the agent, and therefore his to own and consume. Moore, however, 
points out that, since personal information can be copied, personal information, can also be 
non-rivalrously consumed. A person’s right to control information about himself also does 
not exclude the possibility of others also owning such information5 (Moore, 2010, pp. 84-87). 
Concerns about informational privacy is thus not centred round the value of personal 
information as such in relation to its originator, but centred round the person’s normative 
ability to control particularly valued spheres. Theories of informational privacy based on 
one’s right to control information about oneself, can thus only compare privacy violations to 
trespassing or unauthorized intrusion of a “[s]pace or sphere of personal information, whose 
accessibility and usage ought to be […] controlled by its owner and hence kept private” 
(Floridi, 2005, p. 193). By comparing privacy violations to trespassing, control-based 
theories do not seem adequate in order to account for the severity of the distress caused by (at 
least some) violations of informational privacy. On the other hand, as stated by Floridi  
 
“[m]y” in “my information” is not the same “my” as in “my car” but rather “my” as in 
“my body” or “my feelings”: it expresses a sense of constitutive belonging, not of 
external ownership, a sense in which my body, my feelings and my information are 
part of me but are not my (legal) possessions (2005, p. 195, italics in the original).  
 
When personal information is considered not only as something produced by the person, but, 
as an essential part of the person herself, one will realize that – as one would not consider the 
unauthorized removal of someone’s leg as mere theft, but as that of causing physical harm to 
the person in question – when a person‘s personal informational is accessed without 
authorization, it should not be considered merely as a violation of this person’s normative 
ability to control access to a particularly valued sphere of her personal information, but as 
that of causing informational harm to the person (since such access endangers her stable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Moore’s solution to this is by employing a version of John Locke’s proviso on acquisition: “For this labor 
being the unquestionable property of the laborer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at 
least where there is enough and as good left for others” (Locke, 1980 [1689], quoted in Moore, 2010, p. 84). 
When enough and as good is viewed as a “no harm no foul rule” or in Moore’s terms as a Pareto-based proviso, 
actions that pass this standard would leave little room for rational complain (Moore, 2010, p. 84). Informational 
privacy rights are justified in that the individual’s use and control over their own personal information would 
not necessarily worsen others (Moore, 2010, p. 85). 
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functioning as an autonomous informational system6).      
 In relation to the above example of life-logging and wearable devices, I think it 
appropriate to point out that an informational re-conceptualization of personhood would 
provide an answer to another point of concern for the liberal accounts of informational 
privacy. According to Benn “[i]t is the fact of natural personality, not of humanity, which 
makes the crucial difference between right bearers and other objects” (1988, p. 240). 
Although Benn makes allowance for someone defective in autarchy to qualify as a person, 
“[t]he respect that is owed to a person may generate different rights and immunities where the 
person is nonautarchic” (1988, p. 156). This would mean that, because privacy rights are 
grounded in the principle of respect for persons, someone defective in autarchy (depending 
on their defect) would, at least to a certain degree, have limited moral rights to informational 
privacy. Similarly to Benn, Moore, although not accounting for privacy rights as the 
protection of some essential or intrinsic value of autonomy, argues for autonomy as a 
condition for acquiring (privacy) rights in the first place. Individuals acquire rights to control 
their own bodies, capacities, and powers gradually as they grow into adulthood, and they may 
fade away at the end of life (Moore, 2010, p. 64). The need for privacy is, according to 
Moore, due to the universal need for separation as part of securing survival. What 
distinguishes separation from privacy, on his account, is that rights entail obligations and 
claims against others, and it is the capacity of free will that caters for such obligations and 
claims. Because it is the subjects’ capacity of free will and not the potential of free will that 
gives rise to privacy, privacy rights can only gradually be obtained in accordance with the 
development of the subjects’ capacities. This means, according to Moore, that privacy rights 
come in degrees (Moore, 2010, pp. 47-64). Persons who have developed their capacity for 
rationality or free will to perfection, would be the ones entitled to the most comprehensive 
rights. On the other hand, some individuals may never be able to obtain privacy rights even to 
a minimal sufficient degree. On Rössler’s account, we value privacy because privacy is that 
which enables autonomy. According to Rössler, it is only if privacy is protected, that a life 
led autonomously is possible (Rössler, 2005, p. 72). Whilst agreeing with Rössler that 
protection of privacy enables autonomy and that autonomy is important, I think Rössler is 
mistaken about autonomy as the sole grounds for valuing informational privacy. Not every 
human being can be considered autonomous, that is, not everyone is capable, in Rössler’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 This claim will be explained and defended in Chapter 4. 
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terms, of asking herself  “the practical question”. This does not, however, mean that 
informational privacy, for these people, should be considered without value, or that avoiding 
the harms that can accompany violations of informational privacy is without interest for 
“nonpersons”. My claim is that, because (as it will become obvious) informational privacy 
rights should not be based on personhood as autonomy, but the more inclusive concept of 
informational personhood, any account ascribing informational privacy rights as a matter of 
degree would be unjustified.          
  Thus, in what to come, I will argue that the appropriate grounds for 
justification of informational privacy should neither be autonomy, authenticity, or autarchy, 
nor should the right to privacy be that of a right to control. I will argue that we must reject the 
view of a person’s information as produced by that person and thus theirs to control, and 
instead suggest a unification of the person and her personal information. This means that 
personal information should be considered an essential part of, and therefore, not to be 
readily separated from, the person (whatever ‘person’ might mean). By considering personal 
information not only as a product of the I or the person, but instead fully incorporate 
information into the person or agent, personal information should be valued as essential or 
constitutive parts of ourselves. When (personal) information is viewed in this way, the moral 
status of the person should be extended to include her constitutive information, which will 
provide us with forceful rights to informational privacy.       
 In order to defend a view of informational privacy based on informational 
personhood, it will be necessary to explain the nature of informational selves.   
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3 Informational Conception of Personhood 
In the previous chapter I implied that a unification of the person with its information is 
required for an adequate justification of informational privacy rights. Even though Benn and 
Rössler’s liberal conception of personhood, in my view, initially seems to provide intuitive 
justifications for informational privacy rights, I find it lacking in its ability to provide for 
informational privacy within the informational environment (due to advances in information 
and communication technologies). The digital informational environment is made up of ”[…] 
programs, algorithms, data structures, and other objects […]” (Colburn and Shute, 2010, p. 
97) that are not subject to physical constraints (they are, however, subject to logical 
constraints) (Colburn and Shute, 2010, p. 97). Both the (interacting) informational entities 
and their patterns of interaction are constructed through new Information and Communication 
Technologies developed by computer scientists and engineers. Since we increasingly live our 
life in the environment they create, these technologies have great impact on our lives. In the 
digital world or environment the informational nature of the person becomes apparent in that 
“[d]igital technology enables the preservation of the minutia of […] who we are” (Solove, 
2004, p. 1), That is, in the digital environment the person is a collection of data which is 
“[…] digitized into binary numerical form, which enables computers to store and manipulate 
it with unprecedented efficiency” (Solove, 2004, p. 2). The informational nature of the 
person, however, is not reflected in conception(s) of personhood, and so we do not recognize 
that when we are dealing with personal data or information in the digital world, what we are 
dealing with is the person itself. I will therefore argue that what is required for a sufficient 
justification of informational privacy rights in order to provide for informational privacy 
within the digital informational environment, is that the concept of personhood upon which 
these rights are to be based, must adequately reflect the informational nature of the person.
 Thus, as a preliminary for determining the moral criterion for informational privacy 
rights (in Chapter 4), in this chapter and based on Floridi’s (2011) construal of the person as a 
multi-agent system, I will argue for a conception of the person, as a set of information, that is, 
for an understanding of the person as constitutively made up of information and 
informational processes. Personal information is not, on this view, a product of the person in 
question, but rather the person itself.         
 As mentioned in section 2.1, Benn (1988) argues that the condition of personhood is 
to see or consider oneself as a chooser. A person knows herself as thinking and feeling; 
thinking and feeling are inward processes, and these inwards processes can themselves be the 
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intentional objects of thought and feeling. This implies that to be conscious of oneself as a 
person, that is, as a chooser, is to believe that these inward processes are causally effective 
(Benn, 1988, p. 92). A person’s identity is, according to Benn, a “continuing identity of 
interests” (1988, p. 107). Interests are, in this context, to be understood as 
 
[…] those forms of activity which provide the foci for his attention and which he 
perceives as giving point to his actions and his projects. They are those things in 
which he “takes an interest,” such as the welfare of his family, his football team, 
music, philosophy, or the freedom from Hunger Campaign” [the person’s interests] 
provide the strands of his identity over time, through which he is able to see 
continuity of meaning and pattern in what he is and does (Benn, 1988, pp. 106-107, 
my insertion).  
 
By this, a person takes on a variety of interests, but since we are subject to a diverse range of 
competing possibilities, the coherence of a person’s set of interests depends on being 
informed by the stable values and principles of the person in question. By stable values and 
principles she can place herself amongst the competing possibilities and recognize or create 
in herself a coherent set of beliefs to the effect of creating for herself a personal identity. 
Coherence or consistency is however something that can only be aimed at but not perfectly 
achieved. (Informational) privacy is, accordingly, justified by our need for being able to 
choose what to reveal of ourselves in different situations in order to establish, sustain, and 
develop our personal identities (Benn, 1988, p. 282). Informational privacy is thus, according 
to Benn, the ability to “[…] prevent unauthorized access to facts about oneself that “give one 
away” – that if freely available would impair one’s capacity to manage the complex system 
of appearances with which one confronts the world” (Benn, 1988, p. 288).  
 Similarly, Rössler argues that informational privacy matters because we view it as an 
intrinsic part of our self-understanding as autonomous individuals to be able to control our 
self-presentation. In order to manage our self-presentation, we must be able to control access 
to our own personality. It should therefore, to a great extent, be in the hands of the person to 
control what others know about her, or at least the person should have the ability to guess 
what others know about her in any particular situation (Rössler, 2005, pp. 111-116). 
 According to Benn and Rössler, we have an interest in informational privacy because 
we consider ourselves as autonomous choosers or because we value autonomy. In these 
theories, informational privacy is considered only to involve a right to self selected self-
presentations, justified by conceptions of persons as choosers or by the value we place on 
autonomy. Informational privacy rights are accordingly, rights to control or at least to 
	  	   21	  
monitor what information about oneself is revealed or known by what others in which 
situations. Accordingly in these theories, what we are jeopardizing by violations of 
informational privacy is only our self selected self-presentations.    
 Contrary to this I will argue that within the informational environment, informational 
privacy is not to be considered as just involving a person’s right to autonomy in her self-
presentation, but a claim on others to treat personal information as moral entities7. The person 
is embedded, by rapidly evolving informational technologies, in “the informational 
environment” by virtue of her personal information. In order to fully appreciate the 
implications these technologies have on our interactions within the “informational world”, as 
‘online (informational) agents’ or ‘networked persons’, we need a new conception of what an 
online or networked person is and how (personal) information is related to such an agent or 
person. I suggest that, in this context, the appropriate conception of personhood is that of 
persons as appropriately enclosed sets of information and informational processes. I will 
argue that this conception of personhood will provide a stronger justification of informational 
privacy rights. When we conceptualize personhood in informational terms, that is, when a 
person can be conceptualized as constitutively made of information, unauthorized access and 
distribution of personal information would not just impair one’s capacity to manage a system 
of appearance, or self-presentation, but unauthorized access and distribution would impair the 
(informational) person herself. In informational terms, taking or collecting, and distributing 
personal information is not to be considered only as collecting and distributing some 
knowledge about that person, but instead ought to be considered as taking and distributing 
(parts of) the person herself.          
 In this chapter I will in section 3.1, as a foundation for the moral unification of the I 
and the ME, give an outline of Floridi’s (2011) account of the informational person. Based on 
this account, the person will be conceptualized as a set of information and informational 
processes, and conceived of as a distributed system, consisting of three kinds of 
encapsulating membranes, working and functioning together as three agents forming a multi-
agent system. In section 3.2, the consciousness membrane’s role as a function of unification 
and coordination of the multi-agent system will be emphasized. Personhood will be suggested 
as the multi-agent system’s or person’s degree of informational detachment, that is, as the 
encapsulation of personal or constitutive semantic information. First, however, I will, in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This claim will be defended in Chapter 4. 
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following paragraphs, clarify some central informational concepts that will be useful both in 
this and the following chapter.       
 Information objects can, according to Floridi, be understood as data structures and 
their behaviours bundled together into one package, i.e., into one object of information. An 
informational object is by this an entity constituted by a set of data8 (Floridi, 2002, p. 288). 
The identifying data or property of the object, according to Floridi, “[…] is not determined by 
its contingent properties as a physical body, including its shape or colour” (2002, p. 288), it is 
rather its unique data structure, or, in terms of Bates (2006), its unique “patterns of 
organization”, that determines the identity of the entity in question. According to Bates: “The 
patterns of organization of everything in the universe (other than pure entropy or “patternless-
ness”) involve every physical, biological, and cognitive pattern of organization that exists or 
is extracted by sensing beings” (2006, p. 1035). For example, as suggested by Floridi (2002, 
p. 288) the identity of a pawn in a chess game is not (necessarily) determined by the shape 
and colour of its physical body. One could be using a cork instead of a pawn by infusing into 
the cork a pawn’s data structure or patterns of organization. For instance, one could decide 
that the cork is to be one of the eight least valuable white pieces of a game of chess. The least 
valuable piece having three behavioural rules: “[…] it can move forward, one square at a 
time (but with the option of two squares on the first move); it can capture other pieces only 
by a diagonal, forward move; and it can be promoted to any piece, except a king, when it 
reaches the opposite side of the board” (Floridi, 2002, p. 288). The information object is the 
sum of the elements, i.e. the set of data that constitutes a whole with its own distinct qualities. 
In the case of the cork pawn, it is not the physical patterns of organization of the cork that 
constitutes the “pawn identity”, but the distinct qualities of the pawn, that is, in this case, the 
corks strategic position on the board and its behavioural rules.     
 The Informational Environment (or in terms of Floridi (1999) The Inforsphere) is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 According to Floridi the definition of data:  
 
Dd datum=def. x being distinct from y, where x and y are two uninterpreted variables and the relation of 
‘being distinct’, as well as the domain, are left open to further interpretation (Floridi, 2010a, p. 23) 
 
can be applied in three different ways. Firstly data can be understood just as lacks of uniformity (that is, data are 
differences) in the world, they are then pure data, meaning data (or differences) before interpretation. They are 
what must be in the world for information (data + meaning and/or function) to be possible. Secondly, data are 
lacks of uniformity i.e. differences or asymmetries between (the perception of) two, or more, physical states of a 
system. And, thirdly, data are lacks of uniformity between two symbols of a code, for example the differences 
between two letters in an alphabet (Floridi, 2010a, pp. 23-24). 
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environment shared by all biological and engineered entities or agents by virtue of their 
informational character. According to Floridi, the infosphere is a concept that  
 
[m]inimally […] denotes the whole informational environment constituted by all 
informational entities (thus including information agents as well), their properties, 
interactions, processes, and mutual relations. It is an environment comparable to, but 
different from, cyberspace, which is only one of its sub-regions, as it were, since it 
also includes offline and analogue spaces of information. Maximally, it is a concept 
that, given an informational ontology, can also be used as synonymous with reality, or 
Being. The difference the two readings is a function of our understanding of 
information, as something that has only semantic properties (e.g. Wikipedia) or also 
ontic properties (information as data patterns, e.g. the magnetic structure of a digital 
support) (Floridi, 2013, p. 6, italics in the original’’) 
 
In this thesis a maximal reading of the concept will be adopted.    
 Level of abstraction (LoA) can be understood as that information of a system that is 
given attention. According to Floridi, we view any system according to our own interests, 
which adjust and tailor our choices of conceptual interfaces (or frameworks), i.e. our own 
levels of abstraction. Any system can be analysed through a range of LoAs, each LoA 
making possible a determinate analysis or model of the system, with the result that a system 
can have a range of models (Floridi, 2013, pp. 30-31). LoAs are non-empty finite sets of 
observables which can be nested, disjoint, or overlapping, and can be hierarchically ordered 
in some scale of priority. The LoA also indicates the amount of complexity by which a 
system is viewed, the more LoAs included in the LoA used to analyse a particular system, the 
more finely grained the analysis of that system. For instance, once a variable p is interpreted 
as for example Mary (p=Mary), “depending on the LoA and the corresponding set of 
observables available at that level p=Mary can be analysed as the unique person called Mary, 
as a Woman, as a human being, as an animal, as a form of life, as a physical body and so 
forth” (Floridi, 2013, p. 32; 2002, p. 288). In this case, the higher the level of abstraction, the 
less detail, so the higher level of abstraction the less likelihood for identifying particular 
individuals. “[I]f Mary is analysed as a human being, more observables could lead one to 
analyse Mary at a lower LoA as a woman, and less observables could lead one to analyse 
Mary at a higher LoA as an animal” (Floridi, 2002, p. 288).     
 By Encapsulation I will mean that of separating and enclosing the relevant data 
structures and behaviour elements from an environment. It is that of containing data and 
instructions (or information processes) in order to control and reduce improper external 
manipulation of data and/or information, in order to secure the stability of the system 
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constituted by this information. Based on this, I will, in relation to informational privacy, 
define encapsulation as preliminary to and necessary for informational integrity 9 . 
Encapsulation is to keep the system secure from improper/unauthorized manipulation or 
alteration of the unique set of information and informational processes constituting the 
informational system in question in order to promote its sustainability.  
 
 
3.1 The Person as Information 
In this section, as a foundation for a justification of my claim of the moral unification of the I 
and ME, and as a preliminary to determining the moral criterion for what information is 
worthy of protection, I will give an outline of Floridi’s (2011) account of the informational 
nature of selves. This concept will later (in Chapter 4) be suggested as the appropriate re-
conceptualization of personhood for an account of informational privacy capable of an 
adequate justification for informational privacy rights that provides (based on the direct value 
of personal information in relation to the person constituted by the information in question) 
obligatory duties of informational behaviour towards personal information.  
 One of the pioneers in philosophy of information, Wiener (in Bynum 2008, pp. 8-25) 
argues that since many animals, particularly humans, can store information within their 
bodies and use this stored information to adjust future activities, they should be considered as 
information processors constituted by matter-energy and form (information).  Humans as 
biological organisms need, for their (healthy) continuation, exquisitely organized bodies, with 
all its parts integrated and working together as a whole by virtue of the parts appropriately 
communicating with each other. The biological processes within a person’s body cause the 
atoms and molecules that make up his or her body to be exchanged for external ones from the 
surrounding environment to the effect that all (with the exception of brain cells) of the matter 
and energy of the body get replaced approximately every eight years. In order, however, to 
preserve life, functionality, and personal identity, the complex organization or form of the 
body must be maintained by ‘homeostatic’10 biological processes. A person, therefore, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 By ‘informational integrity’ of an informational object I will mean that of preserving the informational object 
as a unified informational whole (this will be further explained in Chapter 4). 
10 Homeostasis is traditionally understood as physiological mechanisms to protect organisms from damaging 
variation in physiological factors.  
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according to Wiener, consists of complex patterns of information embodied in matter and 
energy, and the human being or person is to be understood as an ‘information object’ 
(Wiener, 1954, in Bynum, 2008, pp. 11-12).        
 In the same vein Floridi considers the self as made of information, that is, “[…] 
individuation–the characterization or constitution of the self–is achieved through forms of 
information processing” (Floridi, 2011, p. 555). Information processing is dynamic states of 
information such as: memory, consciousness, and, personal and social narratives. This 
presupposes agents endowed with the right kind of informational processes to the 
construction of personal identities (Floridi, 2011, p. 555).     
 Floridi argues that the informational nature of a self can initially be accounted for in 
terms of an auto-structuring11 physical membrane, “[…] which encapsulates and hence 
detach […] parts of the environment into biochemical structures that are then able to evolve 
into more complex organisms […]” (Floridi, 2011, p. 557-558). According to Floridi, selves 
are not biochemical, but informational structures, and should be considered as resulting from 
further encapsulation, detaching the selves further from the external environment. According 
to the three membranes model the person consists of three kinds of information encapsulating 
membranes: corporeal, cognitive and consciousness. Selves are the results of three phases or 
stages of the evolution, from physical structures, that is, patterns of physical data of an 
environment (the world), to the evolution of organisms, then of intelligent animals, and, 
finally, of self-conscious minds (Floridi, 2011).       
 In the first phase, physical structures are closed off from their surroundings by a 
corporeal (or physical) membrane, encapsulating physical data. This allows for a separation 
of the inside (the structure of the organism, i.e., the individual biotic structure), from the 
outside (the external environment). The membrane also enables the cell a variety of degrees 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Homeostasis depends on control systems which attempt to regulate physiological factors within some 
bounds. Control systems use negative feedback in which sensors compare the level of a factor against 
some (possibly variable) set point and produce a signal proportional to the deviation. This signal 
prompts cells, tissues, or organs to do physiological work to counteract the deviation; the system tries to 
minimize the error between the measured level of the factor and its set point (Woods and Wilson, 2013, 
p. 283).  
  
The purpose of homeostasis is by this understood as to provide a stable internal environment for set processes to 
occur. Each process has a desirable set point. If external influences cause deviation from the set point, the 
physiological mechanisms will restore stability in a homeostatic organism.                                             
11 Floridi explain “Auto-structuring” membranes in terms of ”auto-assembling and, within the assembled entity, 
auto-organising” (Floridi, 2011, p. 557) physical membranes. Auto-organizing or self-organizing systems (or, in 
terms of Floridi, “membranes”) are systems with a tendency to spontaneously transform into distinct (and highly 
complex) patterns (Bawden, 2007, p. 314).  
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of inputs and outputs with respect to the environment. Data, at this level, according to Floridi, 
is physical signals broadcasted by other structures in the environment that are captured by 
permeable membranes of the organism, the body being a barrier between the interior of the 
organism, and its external environment, protecting the stability of the living system, i.e. the 
organism’s physical homeostasis, and by this enabling the system to use the environment to 
its own advantage (Floridi, 2011, pp. 558-559).       
 In the next phase, data becomes encodable resources that can be exploited, through 
some language or other (it needs not be verbal language but can be sounds, visual patterns, 
gestures, behaviours etc.), by an organism such as an animal. For example, noises can be 
made into sounds, and interpreted, through a language, as an alarm. This, however, according 
to Floridi, requires a cognitive membrane, allowing, by some sort of memory, the 
encapsulation of data for processing and communication. The stream of data, that in the 
previous phase was broadcasted quantities without directions, where the source was not 
targeting any particular receiver, now acquires a direction from sender to receiver, and an 
interpretation 12 . The body becomes an interface that connects the system with its 
environment, enabling communication with the world. According to Floridi, the cognitive 
membrane is a configurable or semi-hardwired divide or barrier that detaches the cognitive 
system from its environment or surroundings. This further detachment allows the organism to 
exploit data processing and communication. In this phase, according to Floridi, the stability 
that is to be sustained by means of the cognitive membrane is a stable environment for the 
internal data within the system together with the membranes information processing powers, 
that is, its memory and language (i.e. the system’s codification) (Floridi, 2011, p. 559).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 According to Floridi (2011, p. 559), from this phase or stage on, Shannon’s communication model sets in. 
According to Shannon’s communication model, a selected message flows from an information source, i.e. a 
sender through a transmitter that converts the message into a signal, that is, through an encoder. The 
communication channel then conveys the signal to a receiver where a decoder converts the signal back into a 
message; the receiver interprets the message, and sends the message to its destination (which may be another 
receiver or the message may rest with the initial receiver) and communication is achieved. In Shannon’s 
mathematical theory of communication, information is treated as data communication, that is, as the 
transmission of information that has been encoded or converted for storage and processing (Floridi, 2010a, pp. 
37-42). For instance (here exemplified by a simplified description of the workings of human hearing), in the 
above case of noise made into sound interpreted as an alarm; a noise (i.e. “[…] mechanical disturbance of the 
medium, which may be air, or a solid, liquid or other gas” (Howard and Angus, 1996, p. 1)) is captured by the 
tympanic membrane which converts it into mechanical vibrations to the inner ear. These mechanical vibrations 
are then, by the function of the cochlea of the inner ear, converted into nerve impulses (Howard and Angus, 
1996, pp. 67, 71). By this, the cochlea is a transmitter that encodes or converts the incoming signals into a 
suitable form for transmission and conveys the signals to the cognitive membrane. The cognitive membrane (by 
its information processing powers i.e. its capacity to store information and its capacity for language) converts 
the received signal back into a message, i.e. a sound, and interprets it as an alarm.  
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 Floridi describes the third phase as the evolution of the consciousness membrane 
where data become repurposable information. That is, with the evolvement of the 
consciousness membrane, environmental information13 can be reused or repurposed by the 
cognitive strategy “[…] of using, converting or modifying data/signals for a purpose or 
function […]” (Floridi, 2014, p. 88), such as when sounds become a national anthem (Florid, 
2011, p. 559). This is similar to Grice’s notion of nonnatural meaning (or information). 
Under this notion, the sentence “Those three rings on the bell (of the bus) means that the bus 
is full” carries its meaning or information by virtue of convention (Grice, 2010, p. 108). The 
membrane is thus programmable or soft-wired and the body becomes the outside 
surroundings for an inside experience, the stability or mental homeostasis that is to be 
maintained within the consciousness membrane is that of the self within the system. 
According to Floridi, the evolvement from the previous phase consists in the move from 
aware to self-aware, systems (Floridi, 2011, p. 559).      
 On Floridi’s account of the informational person, each membrane can be understood 
as different degrees of informational detachment or separation from the world, where each 
membrane can be considered an autonomous system or agent14.  As a result, the corporeal 
membrane, the cognitive membrane, and the conscious membrane, can, from an 
informational perspective, be understood as parts of a unitary system, with the three 
membranes or agents forming a multi agent system.      
 On the level of the corporeal or biological membrane, information is “[…] 
information whose nature is biological (genetic) in itself” (Floridi, 2010a, p. 75, italics in the 
original). For instance, the data structures encapsulated in the corporeal membrane include 
DNA structures where DNA molecules are organized into structures to the effect of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 In this context environmental information can be assimilated to Grice’s notion of natural meaning (2010). 
According to Floridi, environmental information is information that can be meaningful independently of an 
intelligent producer or informer. Environmental information consists in physical correlations, such as the 
correlation between the concentric rings emerging on the wood of a cut tree trunk and the tree’s age. Each ring 
is an effect of the tree’s growth of one year. Although this information can be used to estimate the tree’s age, but 
the rings (i.e. “the pattern of organization”) means the tree’s age irrespective of evaluation (Floridi, 2010a, pp. 
32-33). For instance, in terms of Grice (2010, p. 108): “Those spots means measles”, is true whenever there is a 
physical correlation between the spots in question and a morbillivirus regardless of any agent recognizing their 
correlation. By this, environmental information does not require semantic content since environmental 
information consists of correlated patterns or data structures understood merely as physical differences or 
asymmetries Floridi, 2010a, pp. 32-33).  
14 ‘Autonomous’ meaning that the agent or system encapsulate some state that is not accessible to other agents, 
and based on this state “make decisions” on what to do; the system is situated in an environment and is able to 
respond to changes that occur in it in a timely fashion. It can cooperate and be coordinated with other agents to 
the effect of forming a multi-agent system (Ciancarini and Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 2-3).   
	  	  28	  
storing of the organism’s genetic code. The genetic code or the genes stored or contained in 
the DNA are the information itself, and they are performative instructions in that they do not 
describe but perform more or less successfully depending on environmental influences 
(Floridi, 2010a, pp. 76-79). The interaction between the system, i.e. the agent (the corporeal 
membrane) and the environment (the world) takes place through the corporeal agent’s 
permeable structure15.  As mentioned above, in the first evolutionary phase, a corporeal 
detachment or decoupling of the living system (or organism) from the environment (or the 
world) is taking place by corporeal elements fitting together in the structure of a body bound 
together by chemical bonds and orientations (Floridi, 2011, p. 560).    
 At the next stage, however, instead of a physical encapsulation or detachment from 
the world, a cognitive detachment or encapsulation is occurring by the emergence of 
perception. According to Floridi, perception or perceptual experience is the process through 
which information about the world can be acquired. Data as signals are elicited by 
sensorimotor interactions between an agent and an environment. At this second stage the data 
perceived do not generate propositional semantic information, the perceived signals (data) 
have, however, according to Floridi, semantic value or meaning to the extent that the signals 
put the receiving agent in some state. That is, the signals are interpreted and made meaningful 
by putting the perceiver in a certain state (Floridi, 2014, pp. 77, 83-84). According to this I 
understand the data processing taking place in the cognitive membrane as relating to the 
perceiving and interpretation of signals (data) (such as perceiving noise and interpreting it as 
sounds putting the perceiver into a state of alarm) to the effect of providing information for 
appropriate action. I understand the cognitive homeostasis (or stability) to concern the 
process’ guiding capacity, that is, the capacity the semi-hardwired agent (i.e. cognitive 
membrane) has to providing accurate information for appropriate action. The semi-hardwired 
agent needs at this stage no capacity for understanding and explaining the information in 
question. At this stage the semi-hardwired agent, or the cognitive membrane, provides a 
further detachment from being fully absorbed by the world by bonds and orientations 
provided by mutual information, that is, by the measure of the interdependence of data. When 
smoke and fire are two random variables, the mutual information of smoke and fire is a 
quantity that measures the mutual dependence between them. At this stage corporeal and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The same data can, however, be understood as “information about biological (genetic) facts” (Floridi, 2010a, 
p. 75, original italics). But for information to be understood in this way, a cognitive and/or consciousness 
membrane is required. 
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cognitive elements fit together in structures of body and cognition (Floridi, 2011, p. 560). 
 In the final phase, propositional semantic information is generated by the process of 
testimony of data, i.e. the “inside” experiences, encapsulated by the consciousness 
membrane. According to Floridi, in the final phase the body becomes an outside environment 
for an inside experience. Data as signals are elicited by the interaction between the agent 
(now the soft-wired or programmable consciousness membrane) and the body (the hardwired 
interface), and they are repurposed for epistemic, communicative and semantic goals 
(Floridi, 2011, p. 559; Floridi, 2014, p. 88). By repurposing data what is meant is  
 
[t]he cognitive strategy of using, converting or modifying data/signals for a purpose 
or function other that their original natural one, to fit a new use [such as when] a cloth 
becomes a flag, which becomes a country, which becomes a foe to burn, or something 
to be proud of and wear as qualifying one’s identity, and so forth (Floridi, 2014, p. 88, 
my insertion).  
 
The repurposed perceptual data are used as resources to interact with the world by 
constructing semantic artefacts to the effect of a detachment from the world that goes even 
further than the detachment occurring at the previous stage where information was limited to 
perceptual experiences of quantitatively measured mutual dependencies between data. At this 
final stage the corporeal, cognitive and consciousness elements fit together in structures of 
body, cognition and mind (Floridi, 2011, p. 560)16.       
 A person can accordingly be understood as a set of all three membranes. This means 
that the genetic information which is encapsulated by the corporeal membrane just as the 
semantic information encapsulated by the cognitive and the consciousness membranes is part 
of the whole set of information that makes up an individual or person. Based on Floridi’s 
account, I take it that an individual entity consists of a unique set of information according to 
the individual’s level or degree of encapsulating membranes. Each membrane is a subset of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Floridi’s view is here similar to Bawden (2007) who argue that: “[…] the origin of life itself may best be 
viewed as an informational event, as is the subsequent evolution of all life, and the development of intelligence 
and culture […]” (Bawden, 2007, p. 315). Information in the Physical domain can be seen as patterns of 
“organised complexity of matter and energy”, in the biological domain information can be viewed as “meaning 
in context” emerged from the self-organized complexity of matter and energy of a biological organism, 
information in the human domain can be viewed as understanding emerging from complex interactions with the 
internal mental states of a conscious individual, and the mental product of the human consciousness emerging 
from interactions with the world of communicable information, where the unifying concept of information in 
the evolution, is organised complexity (Bawden, 2007, p. 318). An informational event is a change in organised 
complexity, and where life is an example of self-organised complexity “par excellence” (Bawden, 2007, p. 
315).  
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decoded data according to its particular level or degree of encapsulation. A person can, 
accordingly, be conceptualized as a distributed system17. The three membranes, or agents, 
form a loosely combined network, working and acting together and appearing as a unity, 
sharing information processing powers at specific levels of encapsulation, using its own 
information to adapt or adjust itself, in order to maintain stability of the system18.  
 
 
3.2 Self-Individuation by Semantic Information and 
Personhood as Informational Detachment 
The above argument suggests that a person is nothing but a set of information and 
information processing powers. In terms of Hongladarom: “[…] anything one encounters 
when one encounters one’s own self is nothing but information” (2011, p. 362). In this 
section I will give a brief account of the individual as a unique set of information, and argue 
that this information is not to be considered as knowledge about a person, but as constitutive 
parts of the person itself. Personhood will be suggested as the “right” degree of informational 
detachment, that is, as encapsulation of personal or constitutive semantic information. I thus 
suggest that informational privacy rights, as protection of personhood, should be conceived 
of as the protection of the multi-agent system’s informational detachment due to its degree or 
level of informational encapsulation.        
 By adopting Floridi’s account above19, it becomes clear that, to the effect of 
individuation, by accumulating semantic information of data from its agents, the 
consciousness membrane generates testimonies or statements of the system and creates a 
unity of the system as a whole by organizing them into a unique narrative or interpretation of 
itself. I think this is well explained by Hongladarom: 
 
 […] Now suppose that we can accumulate all the statements about one’s body 
throughout a period of time, as well as statements describing one’s mental episodes as 
they progress through his or her life. It does not seem too farfetched to conclude that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 According to Zang, et al., (2004), a distributed system is a multi-agent system consisting of (semi) 
autonomous agents forming a ”loosely coupled network”, working together to solve problems that are beyond 
the capability of its individual agents.  
18 This will be further discussed in Chapter 4 in relation to claiming the direct value of personal information. 
19 One’s “physical life” is constituted by biological information, encapsulated in the corporeal membrane, and 
one’s “mental life” is constituted by series of perceptual events or experiences encapsulated by the cognitive and 
consciousness membranes (Floridi, 2011). 
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these statements taken together represent the account of that person’s self. After all, 
the self is given content through these statements which are true of it and which all 
together give it its uniqueness vis-à-vis other selves. For example, I have my own 
unique narrative which constitutes my life story. Everybody has his or her own unique 
story that accounts for his or her own self. But if it is story, if it is narrative, that gives 
a self its uniqueness, its standing as a self, then it seems that the self is constituted 
through information, for it is information that is contained in the statements that make 
up the narrative of a self (Hongladarom 2011, pp. 362-363).  
 
In Floridi’s line of thought, what makes humans uniquely different from (and more 
successful than) other species (from an evolutionary perspective) is the level of detachment 
of the information from the world by the consciousness membrane’s “[…] semantic 
incapacity of being absolutely and inseparably present, cognitively, where we are located, 
bodily” (Floridi, 2014, p. 92). I take the degree of encapsulation of the information in the 
consciousness membrane to create a distance of the multi-agent system to itself to the effect 
of its unification. That is, by the degree of encapsulation of information by the consciousness 
membrane, the multi-agent system i.e. person satisfies the condition of distance required for 
observation. Due to this distance, that is, due to the degree of informational detachment of the 
consciousness membrane, the multi agent system is enabled to be its own object of 
observation. As mentioned in section 3.1, information encapsulated in the consciousness 
membrane is that of semantic information. Semantic information, however, according to 
Floridi, requires a capacity to “[…] interpret something as something else” (Floridi, 2010b, p. 
276). At the level of consciousness this is the capacity to make testimony of data. 
Accordingly, due to the information and information processing powers of the consciousness 
membrane, the system can observe, make interpretations and testimonies of its own data 
structures to the effect of the multi-agent system’s capacity to unify its information in form of 
a unique coherent or cohesive narrative (or what I in Chapter 4 will refer to as the multi-agent 
system’s self-model). In other words, the consciousness membrane serves as a function of 
unification or coordination of the multi-agent system by generating a detachment or distance 
necessary for self-observation, and by that providing for information processing powers 
capable of constructing a unique coherent self-narrative (or model) to the effect of 
coordinating its agents.          
 By this, the resulting collection of testimonies or statements, which express the 
uniqueness of the system in question, is the set of information which constitutes the 
individual multi-agent system. That is, the uniqueness of the set of information is what 
distinguishes one individual multi-agent system from another. Each individual person is by 
	  	  32	  
this a unique set of three sub-sets of information, encapsulated by the three constituent 
membranes or agents of the multi-agent system together with the kinds of processing powers 
appropriate for the agents’ respective levels of encapsulation. According to Floridi, a person 
can be described as  
 
[…] a discrete, self-contained, encapsulated package containing the appropriate data 
structures, which constitute the nature of the entity in question, that is, the state of the 
object, its unique identity, and its attributes; and a collection of operations, functions, 
or procedures, which are activated by various interactions or stimuli (that is messages 
received from other objects or changes within itself), and correspondingly define how 
the object behaves or reacts to them (Floridi, 2010a, p. 111). 
 
By this, information activates the system or person’s processing powers to the effect of 
information being what converts the system into a reactive form, the system being an 
interdependency of information and information processing powers. The person or multi-
agent system can thus be said to be a unity of information and processing powers, or, in other 
words, a unity of I and ME20. By information being what converts the system into a reactive 
form, information is constitutive of the system in question. Accordingly, when making 
information from such a set accessible or available to others, one is not sharing knowledge 
about a unique collection i.e. person with others, but distributing parts of the set/collection 
i.e. the person itself.           
 In relation to informational privacy, since the person is not necessarily to be 
considered an entity separated from its information, but as an entity consisting of and 
constituted by information, a theory that separates personal information from the person in 
question, and considers personal information (only) as a product or commodity of the agent, 
is mistaken. There is no agent apart from the information and information processes 
encapsulated and detached from the world by the structural membranes of the system. That 
is, in informational terms, in the final phase of evolution, even the self-conscious mind is 
information. Thus, when information from my unique set (the ME set) is taken from this set 
without my consent, ME or at least parts of ME can be conceived of as being taken at the risk 
of injecting instability into the system in question. For instance, in the originate set the 
capacity of storage is limited. When information is taken from this set without authorization 
and stored elsewhere where the capacity of storage may be unlimited or at least greater than 
in the originate set, the unauthorized copied set (i.e. the sum of all sub sets of unauthorized 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Recall that in section 2.2 the I was conceived of as the active part of the self. 
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copied information) could be larger than the original set. In other words, a copy of ME could 
be larger me than MYself. On the other hand, the unauthorized, copied information can then 
be distributed back to the original set. When information is what the person is made of, and 
this information is distributed back to the originate set, the originate set is added to by 
information not authorized as part of the set by the originator (the originate set). The 
originate set is by this manipulated by agents external and unknown to the set in question, 
and a new extended set is constructed. Even if the information cannot be said to be removed 
from the set it is taken from, but only copied, this does not mean that when information from 
a unique set or collection of information is accessed by someone, the person (set) who 
consists of the accessed information, is not at the same time being approached herself by the 
one accessing the information in question. By accessing and copying personal information, 
that is, information from an original unique set (of the appropriate degree of detachment) 
without authorization, the informational self is sustained at the mercy of others, since the 
originate set can easily be altered by copied information being distributed back to it. By 
virtue of new ICTs that can be designed to accommodate more or less unrestricted access and 
distribution, the person is susceptible to unrestricted manipulation21.    
 As a system of informational agents, a person shares an informational environment or 
an informational world (or the infosphere, in terms of Floridi (1999)) with all other 
informational entities. Recall that the informational environment is an environment shared by 
all biological and engineered entities by virtue of their informational character.  
Our interaction is to a greater and greater extent taking place within this informational 
environment or world. Since, from an informational perspective the person can be 
conceptualized as a collection of information, it would not seem implausible that through the 
development of new Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), we would be able 
to, by eliminating “natural” encapsulation of information open up for unlimited distributions 
of persons that could jeopardize the identity of multi-agent systems. For instance ubiquitous 
computing22, a fairly new and rapidly evolving type of computing technology, can diminish 
corporeal encapsulation of information by constructing or designing applications by which a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 This will be further discussed in the following chapter. 
22 Ubiquitous computing means “computer processing power everywhere”, in every technological artefact 
constructed, to the effect of these artefacts being able to communicate with each other by being integrated into a 
computer network. Computing power is no longer residing only in “normal” computers but also in everyday 
familiar devices not normally considered as computers, such as, a refrigerator to the effect of the refrigerator, for 
example, being able to communicate with the grocery store (Hongladarom, 2011, pp. 360-361).  
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human body and an external unit or device can be integrated into a computer network in 
order to be able to communicate with each other. For instance  “[…] when certain physical 
indicators fall below a certain threshold, data can be sent out from the sensor in or on the 
body to the medical unit in order for the latter to take appropriate action” (Hongladarom, 
2011, p. 361). Such an enmeshment of the body in a network is already a reality23, it is thus 
not implausible, from an informational perspective at least, that also data or information 
encapsulated in the cognitive and consciousness membranes can become integrated into the 
network. One can thus, according to Hongladarom, imagine that by means of ubiquitous 
computing bodies and minds can be spread out (that is distributed) throughout a network24, 
and with the occurrence of such a distribution, that is, “[w]hen bodies and selves are spread 
throughout the network, their interaction will not be merely the case of two skin-encased 
bodies talking with or touching each other, but in a sense, it will be the case of two network 
bodies fusing and emerging with each other” (Hongladarom, 2013, p. 232). Although some 
might reject such a scenario as unrealistic25, it emphasizes (in my opinion at least) the 
function of encapsulation of the consciousness membrane. By having direct access to 
information in external consciousness membranes, that is, by having direct access to others’ 
feelings and thoughts (as though they were one’s own) we would be risking our ability to 
self-differentiate to the effect of endangering the stability of the system. By having direct 
access to, for example, others hunger beliefs as though they were “mine”, it might result in 
“me” overeating, and by the other having access to my belief that I have eaten and is full, as 
though it was her own information, this person could be risking starvation. This kind of 
external manipulations of information would, in both multi-agent systems, cause unstable or 
chaotic patterns of food consumption.       	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Recall the example of life-logging in section 2.2. 
24 Hongladarom argue that, assuming one could, “by installing a device in the brain that senses the electrical 
movements inside the brain representing various thoughts and desires and sending out information of these 
movements to a network” (Hongladarom, 2011, p. 362) it would be possible, even without the person’s 
conscious awareness, for a person’s mental episodes to be sent out and accessed directly by others 
(Hongladarom, 2011, p. 363). Hongladarom seems to think this as a way of enhancing the world. According to 
Hongladarom, by having direct access to other’s thoughts and feelings - as opposed to a world where empathy 
seems secondary by having to infer the content of others’ thoughts - one could have full empathy towards others 
and this would, according to Hongladarom, contribute towards a less cruel and evil world (Hongladarom, 2013, 
p 234). In my view, this shows another side of privacy. Our need for limiting access goes both ways. Privacy 
does not only protect us from others’ excessive access to ourselves, but also protects us from having an 
overwhelming (i.e. direct) access to others’ thoughts and feelings. I will, however, not elaborate on this here.      
25 Bates, however, claims that as information scientist one accepts that the subjective constructions a person 
creates of her experiences, that is, the information encapsulated in the consciousness membrane, have an 
objective existence in the nervous system or the brain of the person in question (Bates, 2006, p. 1035). By this, 
Hongladarom’s proposed scenario (described in footnote 24 above) does not seem implausible.   
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 Through new informational technologies, giving rise to increasingly more pervasive 
distribution networks, we are increasingly subjected to extensive (both authorized and 
unauthorized) distribution of ourselves throughout the informational environment, that is, we 
are increasingly subjected to extensive connectedness through distribution. Personhood, on 
the other hand, emerges from the consciousness membrane’s degree of informational 
detachment from its environment, and we are dependent on freedom from being subjected to 
improper or unauthorized external manipulation of our own personal informational in order 
to remain a stable and complete unity. An unauthorized copied (sub) set of information can 
endanger the stability of the original set by subjecting it to a destructive connection with its 
informational environment.         
 Even without the grim prospects of a fusion as described above, I believe the 
informational account of personhood and individuation (i.e. the person as a detached 
collection of information) can provide more sufficient or adequate grounds for a justification 
of informational privacy rights than the above mentioned liberal accounts. If the 
encapsulating membranes, due to the development of more pervasive ICTs, no longer can 
provide a sufficiently robust shield for the information it is encapsulating, but leaves this 
information vulnerable to interference or manipulation by external agents within a network, 
the stability of the system could be at risk. Thus, on the account of the informational person, 
violations of informational privacy it is not only, as claimed by Benn (1988) and Rössler 
(2005), threatening a person’s autonomy, but the informational person herself. Since 
information encapsulated within the three membranes is constitutive of the person, if persons 
have a (moral) claim on others’ respect, such a claim should include respect for the 
information that is constitutive of them.        
 My aim here is not to contest the value of autonomy in general, only that the value of 
autonomy (because informational privacy concern person constitutive information) does not 
give a sufficient foundation for informational privacy rights, since these theories do not 
recognize the moral status of such information. Informational privacy should rather be 
considered from an informational perspective, from which the value of personal information 
can be appropriately defined, and the moral status of personal information can be recognized. 
 The rest of the thesis will be dedicated to defending my claim. 
In the next chapter I will outline the weaknesses of the moral criterion implicit in the liberal 
theories and through this develop a moral criterion for informational privacy of informational 
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agents based on the conception of encapsulation i.e. self-organization or unification as the 
foundation for the right to informational privacy. 
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4 The Moral Criterion for Informational 
Privacy: The Direct Value of Personal 
Information 
In the previous chapter I argued for the conception of informational personhood, as opposed 
to a conventional liberal conception of autonomy, as the appropriate concept of personhood 
for providing a sufficient justification for informational privacy rights. My claim was that 
informational privacy rights should not be grounded on autonomy alone but rather on a 
concept of “the person as information”.        
 In this chapter, I will attempt to justify this claim by arguing that the crux of 
informational privacy is not autonomy in self-presentation but rather that of preservation of 
informational selves i.e. the preservation of multi-agent systems of the right degree or level 
of encapsulation or detachment. The right degree of encapsulation or detachment being that 
of the multi-agent system‘s privileged position, of the first-person LoAi, to organize its 
constitutive information coherently, in order to make itself into a unified model, to the effect 
of optimizing itself as perpetuating or homeostatic information patterns26. I will then develop 
a moral criterion for informational privacy based on the informational conception of 
personhood. My aim will be to show that the re-conceptualization of personhood from 
autonomy to personhood as the degree of informational detachment in a consciousness 
membrane should result in rearticulating informational privacy rights as rights to 
informational integrity rather than rights to control access to one’s personal information.  
 By informational integrity I will mean that of preserving the wholeness or unity of the 
informational person, or in other words, preserving the informational set (person) at the right 
level of detachment or separation from the world, by preventing corruption or improper 
alteration or manipulation by external informational agents, and by that sustaining or 
promoting the internal coherence of the informational person (set).   
 Based on this, I will suggest the right to informational privacy as the right to freedom 
from improper external manipulation of personal information. This reformulation of 
informational privacy right as the right to informational integrity will provide precise 
normative criteria for what information is to be protected by informational privacy right. I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 I have borrowed these terms from Wiener (1954, in Bynum, 2008, p. 18) and Floridi (2013, p. 310) 
respectively. 
	  	  38	  
will claim that by understanding informational privacy rights as rights to informational 
integrity, the right to informational privacy will emerge as a fundamental right not easily 
overridden by opposing interests, while simultaneously being flexible enough to cater for 
some necessary exceptions. In order to account for this view, an informational LoA will be 
adopted as the appropriate normative framework for informational privacy and a distinction 
between direct and indirect value will be claimed, the former being attributed personal 
information.              
 The concern of any theory of informational privacy is to account for the value of 
personal information, any theory, which can adequately account for the value of personal 
information, will also provide for a sufficient justification of informational privacy rights. 
According to Benn (1988) and Rössler (2005), personal information is only valuable in 
relation to the value of autonomy in that informational privacy sustains the agent’s status as 
an autonomous agent and this status is held as a fundamental value. By such views, personal 
information has only an indirect value, that is, its (potential) value is justified and measured 
by another (fundamental) value, i.e. autonomy. From an informational LoA, on the other 
hand, personal information is constitutive of the person, that is, a person is an information 
object. Constitutive information is the elements of a core or nucleus set of information of the 
multi-agent system. By this I mean that information that cannot be constitutive, i.e. a member 
or element of another set. In other words, personal information is that information, either as a 
single piece, or in a combination, which is unique to a particular (informational) person. 
Since manipulations of the core or nucleus set of information can cause corruption of the 
person as an information object, keeping this set of information from improper manipulation 
is necessary for sustaining the information object in question.     
 A distinction can thus be made between what I will refer to as direct and indirect 
value of personal information. By personal information and thus informational privacy 
having a direct moral value I mean a relational notion of value, similarly to the one defended 
by Moore (2010), where value is attached to an object or state that “[…] sustains, promotes, 
or furthers […] the entity in question” (Moore, 2010, p. 38). I suggest direct value, as the 
value personal information has by virtue of its (internal) relations, that is, its membership in 
the core or nucleus set of information, which constitutes the entity in question. Direct value is 
opposed to indirect value or potential/conditional value, or, in other words, value on the 
condition of some other value or good. This means that when the entity in question is the 
informational person, its personal information, i.e. its core or nucleus set of information, is 
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valuable in itself in relation to constituting or being that person, and not potentially valuable 
on the condition of some other good. Since, on an informational normative framework, no 
moral distinction is to be made between the person and her information, I will claim that this 
distinction will lead to the justification of personal information being ascribed moral status.
 Himma (2004) argues against Floridi’s (2002) claim that that information is 
intrinsically valuable and is thus deserving of at least some minimal moral respect. I am not 
considering this debate here, I will however make use of Himma’s argument of intrinsic 
value in order to convey my view on how moral value can be ascribed to personal 
information due its direct value in relation to the multi-agent system. According to Himma, 
“intrinsic value” can, on the one hand, be understood as that which characteristically is 
valued for its own sake by an evaluator. What people characteristically value for its own sake 
is then either considered as the sole ground of moral worth, or at least, that people have some 
morally protected interest in that which they characteristically value for its own sake 
(Himma, 2004, p. 146). On the other hand, “intrinsic value” can be understood as, to borrow 
a term from Korsgaard (1996, p. 250), “it has its goodness in itself”, value here referring to 
the source of the goodness (Korsgaard, 1996, p. 250). That is, when talking of “intrinsic 
value” in this sense, one is looking for identifying the source as a class of objects or entities 
that induce obligatory constraints on others’ treatment of it. In other words, it is this kind of 
value which gives rise to moral standing or status. An agent or person has moral status, that 
is, is to be considered a moral entity because others may not treat her as a mere means. A 
moral entity thus has a claim on others’ respect (Himma, 2004, p. 146). According to Himma, 
(personal) information cannot be considered as having moral status because  
 
[t]o say that we value information for its own sake is to say that it is intrinsically good 
for beings like us that have moral standing. But while this claim may imply that it is 
morally good, other things being equal, that beings like us have information, it 
doesn’t imply that information has moral standing in the sense of being owed 
obligations. Happiness is valued by us for its own sake, but this simply means that it 
is morally good for moral patients who intrinsically value happiness; it does not imply 
the very counterintuitive claim that moral agents owe an obligation of respect to 
happiness (Himma, 2004, pp. 155-156, italics in original). 
 
Even though knowledge is not uncommonly pursued for its own sake, it is only in relation to 
knowledge seeking agents that information by virtue of being knowledge can be valued for 
its own sake (Himma, 2004, p. 155). Accordingly, information can only be considered as 
having intrinsic value in the former sense in terms of the intrinsic value of knowledge in 
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relation to an agent with moral status, and thus, (personal) information cannot be ascribed 
moral status.             
 My claim is that Himma (2004) is mistaken in that moral value ascribed information 
necessarily leaves information void of moral status. I will suggest my notion of the direct 
value of personal information as an alternative, in which the moral status of (personal) 
information is provided for by its relation to the set of which it is a member.   
 As mentioned above, according to Himma (2004), there are two different ways in 
which to understand information as having “intrinsic value”, one is to consider information or 
knowledge as characteristically valued, by moral entities, for its own sake, the other is to 
consider the value of information as an entity itself worthy of respect i.e. as a moral entity. 
While differentiating between two senses of “intrinsic value” only one of which generates 
moral status, Himma (2004) (in the vein of Floridi (2002)) does not distinguish between two 
types of information: information with direct moral relevance (moral-relevant) in relation to 
the entity in question, and information only indirectly morally relevant (in this context, 
moral-irrelevant), in the sense of Himma’s account of the first kind of intrinsic value. Moral-
relevant information i.e. person-constitutive information is, by virtue of its direct value of its 
person-constituting properties, generating moral status because there is no distinction 
between the person having moral status and her information.     
 Himma (2004, pp. 155-156) compares the value of information to that of happiness, 
however, in case of happiness, a clear distinction can be made between a state of happiness 
and the person being happy (that is, I am not happiness, nor is being happy necessary for my 
existence), in the case of personal information, on the other hand, no clear distinction can be 
made between a unique set of information and the informational agent being that information 
(recall in Chapter 3 the informational person was conceptualized as packages or sets of 
information and information processes activated by this information). According to Himma, 
(personal) information is valuable only in relation to a moral agent separate from its 
information, and so, no moral status is ascribed to the moral-relevant information of the 
agent. On the other hand, when no distinction is made between the moral agent and her 
moral-relevant information, i.e. the information constituting the person, it becomes evident 
that it is not appropriate to compare the value of this information with the value of happiness. 
The state of being happy might be a valued state for a person to be in, but happiness is not a 
necessary property of the person, that is, it is not a constitutive part of the person. On the 
other hand, by virtue of being an element of the entity’s core or nucleus set of information, 
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the direct value of personal information for the informational entity is that of both 
constituting and sustaining the entity in question.        
 The value of personal information is relevant to a multi-agent system, due to the 
particular relation it has to its own personal information, as a distributed system. Since this 
system is consisting of three membranes (i.e. a corporeal, cognitive, and, consciousness 
membrane) forming a loosely combined network, acting together appearing as a unity, and 
sharing the processing powers of collecting and manipulating data or information in order to 
create and maintain stability for the whole system. The multi-agent system thus “[…] uses its 
own information to modify itself […] to enhance its survival, responding to both [external] 
and internal stimuli to modify its basic functions to increase its viability” (Collier, 2004, p. 
164, my insertion). The relation it has to its own personal information is that of constructing 
out of this information a coherent or unity of information consistent with the data this 
information is extracted from.         
 The state of informational privacy27 is what protects the self-constructed unity of 
personal information from being (improperly) manipulated. Informational privacy, thus, 
directly preserves and furthers the informational integrity of the person, i.e. the person as an 
informational object. As will become evident below, the importance of adopting an 
informational normative framework when considering informational privacy rights, is that by 
such an adoption informational privacy is not dependent on a separate and more fundamental 
value in order to be justified as a fundamental right, neither is any additional social or 
conventional framework required to specify its applications.     
 In the following I will first (in section 4.1) consider the consequences of not 
recognizing the direct value of personal information, I will claim that a theory of 
informational privacy not recognizing the direct value of personal information cannot provide 
the forceful and complete rights to informational privacy needed for adequate protection 
within the digital informational environment. In section 4.2, I suggest that a distinction 
between the natural and informational person should be understood as a distinction in LoAs 
and not as an ontological distinction. I will argue that when the “natural” person is identified 
with the “informational” person, the direct value of personal information will become 
apparent, and the moral status of personal information can be recognized. In section 4.3, I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The state of informational privacy will, in section 4.4 of this chapter, be suggested as the “informational” 
state of having one’s core or nucleus information successfully encapsulated or encased within the appropriate 
membrane(s), and by that, protected from improper or unauthorized external manipulation.  
	  	  42	  
will formulate an account of how the content of personal information is to be determined. 
Then, in section 4.4, I will define the harm in taking this information as the harm of 
informational fragmentation, or informational de-unification, of the multi-agent system or 
informational person, with the accompanying risk of de-stabilizing the system or person in 
question. In section 4.5, some objections to the informational re-conceptualization of 
personhood and informational privacy rights based on this re-conceptualization will be 
anticipated and briefly discussed.         
 As mentioned in Chapter 1, this thesis is concerned with finding a moral foundation 
for informational privacy rights. The objective of this chapter is to find a precise criterion for 
what information is worthy of protection and to explain the moral concerns in taking this 
information. I will claim that by recognizing the direct value of personal information, 
informational agents will be placed under obligatory constraints with regards to their 
informational behaviour. Due, however, to the limited scope of this thesis, the content of such 
moral constraints and the conditions for justificatory exceptions, cannot be developed further 
here. Although, as an initial step, I think moral constraints on informational behaviour must 
be considered as constraints relating at least, to both collection and distribution, such as, 
if/when collection can be justified, obligatory constraints on distribution will still stay in 
place. This task, however, must be left to future work.   
 
 
4.1 The Value of Informational Privacy Rights as 
Indirect 
The value of personal information has, conventionally, been stated as conditional upon some 
other value taken as fundamentally valuable. Rössler (2005), for instance, argues that 
personal information is worthy of protection only on condition of the fundamental value of 
autonomy.  I will, in this section, consider the implications of taking a roundabout way in 
accounting for informational privacy rights, and point to some obvious inadequacies in 
theories taking this stance, particularly in view of the revolutionary developments of the 
informational environment.         
 According to Benn “[a] person enjoys privacy as of right if he possesses the 
normative capacity to decide whether to maintain or relax the state of being private” (1988, p. 
266). On the other hand, a person has an interest in privacy if he would be better off (in their 
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own view) either if he was in a private state or had the power to control access to it (Benn, 
1988, p. 266). In Benn’s view we have a special interest in privacy (as access control) 
because free access by others to information about ourselves will make us “vulnerable to 
discrimination, victimization, or blackmail” and by that threaten a person’s freedom (1988, p. 
293). According to Rössler, the reason why informational privacy matters so much to people, 
is the value they place on having control over their self-presentation. Informational privacy 
provides them with control over “how they want to present or stage themselves, to whom 
they want to do so and in which contexts […] over how they want to see themselves and how 
they want to be seen” (Rössler, 2005, p. 116). Violations of informational privacy entail a 
loss of such control and “[…] implies a disruption of the […] well-founded, normative […] 
horizons of expectations that a person has regarding the knowledge that others may 
justifiably or legitimately have about her […]” (Rössler, 2005, p. 114). The legitimacy of 
ones expectations rests, according to Rössler 
 
[…] on the validity of social conventions and norms, which regulate […] what counts 
as worthy of protecting and as intimate, what is viewed as a legitimate shield or zone 
protecting a person from public attention or control, in other words what is to be 
subject to individual information control and what is not. These expectations are 
regulated, therefore, by a complex, but nonetheless stable fabric of social norms and 
conventions within which we operate and control the various relations in which we 
live (Rössler, 2005, p. 118).  
 
These norms, establishing what is to be considered public on the one hand, and what is to be 
considered private on the other, can be understood as articulations of a normative principle, 
guaranteeing both negative liberties and the positive possibilities for living these out. This 
means, according to Rössler, that the conventions regulating informational privacy must in 
the end be “validated in terms of this principle guaranteeing individual autonomy” (2005, p. 
118). The moral criterion for what can legitimately be accessed without authorization by the 
person in question is, according to Rössler, established through social norms and conventions 
grounded in established civil liberties. Unauthorized access to a person’s information that 
does not jeopardize any civil liberties entitled to her is not regarded as violations on this 
person’s informational privacy. What distinguishes illegitimate from legitimate collection of 
personal information is the (actual or possible) effect such collection has (or can have) on the 
person’s autonomy. Rössler’s claim is that the reason for valuing privacy is that of placing 
value on autonomy, “personal” information as such is thus not to be ascribed any moral 
value. On these grounds, Rössler recognizes four groups of data in order to determine what 
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data are to count as worthy of protection28. These data are as such, according to Rössler, 
neither personal nor valuable, but their informational significance, that is, “[…] when these 
data become ‘personal’ in nature or when legitimate data collection ceases to be so, as well as 
when data can be used to identify a person […]” (2005, p. 124), is relative to the context in 
which they occur (Rössler, 2005, pp. 124-126).      
 Rössler does not recognize personal information as a particular kind of information in 
justifying informational privacy rights. In Rössler’s view it is not the particular information 
that has been accessed without authorization that determines privacy violations. It is rather 
the contexts, in which this information is accessed, that that can turn unwanted or 
unauthorized access into privacy violations (Rössler, 2005, pp. 124-125). Benn argues that 
that one is entitled to access and collect others’ personal information if this information is 
relevant to a legitimate purpose (and not particularly sensitive). A prospective employer is, 
for example, entitled to ask former employers about the applicants’ competence. On the other 
hand, the employer is not entitled to information not relevant to the job, such as perhaps race, 
religion etc. since this kind of information will give the employer the ability to discriminate 
in the recruiting process, on irrelevant grounds (Benn, 1988, p. 293). Similarly, Rössler 
claims that what information can justifiably be accessed, collected, and distributed by others 
without the consent of the person in question, depends on the interested parties, who they are 
and their motivation or reason for accessing, collecting, and distributing the ‘personal’ 
information in question. Legitimate motives for collecting personal information are motives 
or reasons that are in themselves not intentions of control. Motives of efficiency or profit, for 
example, can be legitimate motives for collecting and distributing personal information since 
these incentives as such are not intended as constraining the person’s civil liberties, 
guaranteed by a liberal democracy, and as such do not violate the person’s informational 
privacy. On the other hand, if or when these incentives or motives turn into a matter of 
control, without the knowledge of or against the will of the person being controlled, they 
should be considered harmful to the person’s civil liberties, and thus illegitimate (Rössler, 
2005, pp. 123-125). It is puzzling, however, in my opinion, when Rössler defines violations 
of informational privacy as the constraining effect information gathering has on a person’s 
autonomy in self-presentation on the one hand, but justifies legitimate contexts of collecting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 These groups include thoughts and mental states, feelings and views in general; personal data that can 
provide information of the person’s preferences, traits and habits; data about (legitimate) activity in one’s own 
home; and data about activities performed in public and “spatiotemporal facts about a person” (Rössler, 2005, 
pp. 122-124). 
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information by turning to motives for collecting on the other. To me it is not clear that these 
correspond, that is, it is not clear why the motives of the collector, and not the collecting, is 
what affects the way I choose to present myself. As Rössler points out,  
 
[w]hat persons are willing to recount or divulge about themselves in various contexts 
differs greatly according to the individual concerned, as well, of course, as the culture. 
The fact that there are these individual differences clearly has nothing in itself to do 
with the degree of autonomy in the person. There is obviously a degree of leeway as 
to whether people are more or less open or reserved, or show a greater or lesser need 
to communicate with people […] (Rössler, 2005, p. 118, footnote 20).  
 
However, if the value I place on my autonomy in self-presentation is what justifies my right 
to informational privacy, and, if what information about myself I comfortably share with 
others depend on my personality, and this in turn affect how I choose to present myself, I 
cannot see how the motives for collecting is significant if the collected information is 
information I am not comfortable with sharing. In my opinion, Rössler’s need for involving 
motives as a differentiating factor, is because she identifies informational privacy as the 
conflicting interest of “wanting to hide” to that of “wanting to know” (Rössler, 2005, p. 126), 
and, by that, the right to informational privacy is taken as an opponent to the established civil 
liberties “[…] to look at the world – out of curiosity – as an when [one] want to, and to tell 
other’s that they do so as and when they want to […]” (Rössler, 2005, p. 125). By conceiving 
personal information only as a source of knowledge about someone, that is, as a part of the 
world that people have “the right and the liberty to look at”, and not conceiving personal 
information as a constitutive part of the person itself, both Rössler and Benn must proceed to 
justify informational privacy in a roundabout way. Informational privacy is only ascribed 
conditional or indirect value, leaving any value of informational privacy contingent upon its 
contribution to autonomy.         
 According to Benn (1988) and Rössler (2005), the right to privacy, by definition, 
restricts another’s right to observe. Since the right to observe is grounded on fundamental 
liberties, the onus of justification, prima facie, rests on the one who will restrict or control 
observation. Rössler (2005, pp. 125-126), therefore, argues that a normative principle upon 
which a right to informational privacy is based, must be grounded in equally fundamental 
values, if it is not to be constantly cancelled by overriding rights. In order to constitute an 
equal fundamental right, not readily overridden by more basic rights, informational privacy 
must originate from the “[…] idea of the autonomy of the person or of respect for her 
identity” (Rössler, 2005, p. 126). If a restriction on observing can be justified by the 
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fundamental value of autonomy, then the information collected by motives or intentions 
incompatible with this value cannot be legitimate. On the other hand, any intentions 
compatible with this value is legitimate, and such motives legitimate collection of personal 
data or information (Rössler, 2005, pp. 124-125). Although Benn and Rössler argue for 
informational privacy rights grounded on the value of autonomy, neither of them think of 
autonomy as sufficient for specifying the content of informational privacy rights. Rössler 
argues that the criteria for what information is to be worthy of protection is to be specified by 
well-founded normative horizons of expectations relative to social norms and conventions 
(2005, p. 118). Benn argues similarly that  
 
[t]he liberal cannot give absolute specifications, however, for what is private and what 
is not, because privacy is context relative. I do not mean that standards differ between 
cultures. That is also true, but it is a different kind of relativity. Within the one culture 
the same matter may count as private or not, relative to the social nexus in which it is 
embedded (Benn, 1988, p. 268).  
 
As previously mentioned, my objection to Benn and Rössler’s accounts of informational 
privacy does not rest on a disagreement about the value of autonomy, but since autonomy can 
only provide for a minimal right to privacy (Benn, 1984, p. 224), grounding informational 
privacy on the value of autonomy, rather than on the value of ‘personal’ information as such, 
the right to informational privacy is fundamental only in a roundabout way via the 
fundamental value of autonomy. As argued by both Benn and Rössler, autonomy in itself is 
not sufficient for specifying the content of what is to count as information worthy of 
protection. For this purpose, autonomy requires established social norms and conventions. 
This means that a normative theory of informational privacy grounded on the value of 
autonomy, will not, within an environment without any established norms or conventions, be 
capable of providing the sufficient moral criteria necessary for determining what information 
can be legitimately taken and distributed by others. Also, which will become evident below, a 
theory that bases informational privacy rights on autonomy, in an environment in which not 
only the subjects but also their interactions take a different form from that of which the value 
of autonomy is related to, are shown inadequate, both in their foundation, and in their lack of 
ability to provide for specific moral criteria for what information is to count as worthy of 
protection in that environment.        
 With the development in ICTs we are all forced into a different informational 
environment as different entities with different interaction patterns than that of which we are 
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accustomed to. Colburn and Shute (2010, pp. 97-98) point out that computer science is 
distinguished from other sciences in that computer science, contrary to all other sciences, 
“creates its own subject matter”. Programs, algorithms, and, data structures are, in the digital 
informational environment, not subject to physical, but only to logical constraints. The 
difference being that while social sciences observe and explain already existing patterns of 
behaviour in well defined corporeal objects (or subjects), computer science creates both new 
objects and their patterns of behaviour, or more precisely, computer science both creates and 
studies “[…] procedures, data types, active objects, and the virtual machines that manipulate 
them” (Colburn and Shute, 2010, p. 98). The computational worlds, in which we increasingly 
interact through new ICTs, are “[…] the products of programmers’ creative imaginations 
[…]” (Colburn and Shute, 2010, p. 98). The regions of the informational environment in 
which we increasingly interact as informational entities or persons, are created or engineered 
by computer scientists whose objective is the creation and manipulation of interaction 
patterns between the abstract informational entities occupying the environment (Colburn and 
Shute, 2010, p. 99; 2011, p. 246). For instance  
 
[s]ocial networking is set to undergo [a] transformation with billions of 
interconnected objects […] where individual ‘things’ in the house [such as washing 
machines, refrigerators, bathroom scales, etc.] can periodically tweet readings which 
can be easily followed from anywhere creating a tweetOT  (Gubbi, et al., 2013, p. 
1650, italics in the original, my insertions) 
 
The objects or entities interacting within this environment are, in the same manner as the 
processors, computational abstractions, and represent anything from registers, memory 
locations, programme instructions, numbers, and procedures, to telephone books, calendars, 
and humans (Colburn and Shute, 2011, p. 248-249). Since the information technologies 
available share their ontology with their objects to the effect of a “[…] fundamental 
convergence between digital resources and digital tools […] there is no longer any substantial 
difference between the processor and the processed and the digital deals effortlessly and 
seamlessly with the digital” (Floridi, 2005, p. 188). This enables “[…] devices, which are 
normally not computers, to communicate with one another through a data network so that the 
network itself is not limited to the traditional structure of a computer network, but extends to 
ordinary things, even the human body” (Hongladarom, 2011, p. 360-361). With this, our 
environment can be (and increasingly is) transformed into a “smart environment” that is, a 
“[…] physical world that is richly and interwoven with sensors, actuators, displays, and 
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computational elements, embedded seamlessly in the everyday objects of our lives, and 
connected through a continuous network” (Weiser quoted in Gubbi, et al., 2013 p. 1646). By 
being connected through a (exhaustive) continuous network, individual devices can 
communicate with any other device in the world. A person can for example be integrated into 
a (exhaustive) computer network through body area sensors that monitor physical states of 
the body, and smartphones or smart watches used for communication along with interfaces 
such as Bluetooth for interfacing the sensors (Gubbi, et al., 2013, p. 1650).  
 Thus, with the digital informational environment “the rule of the game” so to speak 
has changed in that both the nature of the entities inhabiting it and their patterns of interaction 
in this environment are drastically different from those on which the aforementioned liberal 
theories of Benn and Rössler are based. The entities assumed or presupposed by Benn and 
Rössler as the basis for their theories are autarchic, or autonomous and authentic concrete, 
non-informational entities with a right to control others’ access to their own personal 
information. The informational environments such entities can adequately operate within, in 
relation to informational privacy concerns, are physically enclosed environments in which the 
person’s ability to control others’ access is achievable. Such environments, due to being 
subject to physical constraints on access, storing, and distribution, can, at least to a certain 
degree, “naturally” accommodate the autonomous person’s informational privacy needs. On 
the other hand, the digital informational environment and its inhabitants or objects are 
constructed so as to accommodate the information technologies available, rather than the 
“natural” person mentioned above. By being integrated into this environment the “natural” 
encapsulation of information of the multi-agent system i.e. person provided by the three 
membranes (the corporeal, cognitive, and consciousness) is diminished to the effect of the 
informational person within this environment lacking “natural” protection against improper 
manipulation.           
 Although, as argued by Floridi (among others)29, computer technology or ICTs may 
provide (at least part of) the solution to the problems concerning information privacy raised 
by the technologies in question, as individuals we lack the knowledge required for utilizing 
the technological means necessary for adequately controlling external access to our personal 
information. As pointed out by Roux and Falgoust:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Floridi (2005) suggests problems involving information privacy to be solved by creating ontological friction 
within the informational environment, while Chinese walls between spheres of access is suggested by Wiegel, 
Van den Hoven, and Lokhorst (2005).   
	  	   49	  
 
While a citizen with a fair amount of knowledge about computers and smart devices 
may be more aware of the channels of information made available by a smart device, 
she still has no control over how applications cache data, and not all applications 
allow the user to manually clear the cache. The “walled garden” approach taken by 
the major smart phone software developers inhibits one’s ability to write more 
privacy-aware applications. In some instances, a user is simply forced to use an 
application or forgo the capability (Roux and Falgoust, 2013, p. 189). 
 
We are thus dependent, to a greater extent, on the mercy of others when it comes to securing 
our informational privacy than what informational privacy rights as control rights take into 
account. That is, we are to greater extent dependent on our moral status (as informational 
objects) in regards to informational privacy rights when this environment is rapidly becoming 
our most important venue of interaction.      
 Considering the impact the developments of new ICTs has on our lives, in order to 
provide for an appropriate analysis of the moral implications that might follow this 
development, an informational normative framework therefore must be in place. A normative 
framework, or normative horizons of expectation, will not do, if the normative framework 
does not involve an adequate concept of its subject. Since the subject is sets of information, 
the normative framework, through which informational privacy concerns is to be considered, 
must be a normative framework that recognizes the moral standing of personal information. 
By adopting an informational framework for informational privacy, when informational 
privacy rights are the protection of personhood, we will realize that personal information in 
itself is worthy of protection. When personal information is considered as constitutive of the 
person, a direct or fundamental value of informational privacy is provided for, and precise 
criteria for what information is to count as worthy of protection can be given independently 
of social norms and conventions.         
 As mentioned above, my objection to Benn and Rössler’s accounts of informational 
privacy does not stem from a disagreement about the fundamental value of autonomy. I rather 
recognize and sympathize with their concern over the harmful consequences caused by free 
access to personal information as valid reasons for promoting and defending informational 
privacy rights. Nevertheless, in my opinion, grounding these rights on the value of autonomy 
is insufficient. The “minimalness” of the right to informational privacy provided by the value 
of autonomy can be remedied by adequate social norms and conventions. In view, however, 
of the development of new ICTs, and the peculiarity of the accommodating informational 
environment, by virtue of which, both its entities and their forms of interactions takes a 
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different form from those presupposed by conventional theories of informational privacy, and 
the increasing impact these new technologies has on our everyday lives, a revision of the 
value of personal information, in order to determine obligatory constraints on informational 
behaviour or interaction is called for.  
 
 
4.2 On the Distinction Between the Natural and the 
Informational Person in Relation to Moral Status     
Above, I have argued that the distinction between the person and her information is mistaken. 
I argued that personal information should not be separated from the moral (human) agent to 
the effect of personal information being ascribed moral status. In justification of this claim I 
argued for a conceptual revision of the conventional, liberal conception of personhood as 
autonomy, to a new conception of personhood as the right degree of detachment and 
unification of personal information. In order to make the new concept more intuitive it will 
be appropriate to outline more clearly the distinction between the natural30 and informational 
person as a distinction in LoA. This distinction in LoA will then be suggested as a solution to 
the objection, articulated by Himma (2004), that the person, as a set of information, is an 
abstract object and thus cannot be identical with the natural person. Since personal 
information is only referring to the natural person who defines the set of information in 
question, any moral status ascribed the natural person cannot as such be extended to the 
informational person, Himma argues (2004, pp. 147-148). The distinction in LoA will then be 
used to elucidate the above claim of the need for an informational LoA as the normative 
framework relating to informational privacy, and serve as a preliminary argument for a 
justification of personal information having direct value, suggested in the beginning of this 
chapter, which in turn will make the right to informational privacy more adequate as a robust 
protection of personal information.        
 Himma (2004, pp. 147-148) raised the objection31, that since a particular natural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 ‘Natural person’ here meaning the concrete individual human being (without taking into consideration any 
specific concept of personhood). 
31 Himma (2004) is not taking part in the discussion of informational privacy in raising this objection; the 
objection is raised against the claim of information in itself (whether personal or not) having intrinsic value.  
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person, Mary, qua the human agent herself, and the person, Mary, qua information object 
cannot be identical, it is not obvious that these two are morally analogous. Himma says that:  
 
To say that a particular person, Mary, can be “modelled” or “analysed” as an 
information object is, then, to say that there exists a set of propositions that contain a 
description of the various states, properties, and attributes of Mary over time and a 
collection of functions defining Mary’s reactions, behaviors, etc. Qua human being, 
Mary is a collection of molecules arranged in a particular way that function in various 
self-sustaining ways; qua information object, the human being Mary is described by 
the set of propositions and functions that constitute an information object. Strictly 
speaking, then, the entity we refer to as “Mary” defines an abstract information object, 
but is not identical with that object (Himma, 2004, p. 148). 
 
From this it should be obvious that the natural person, Maryn, and the informational person, 
Maryi, cannot be one and the same object or entity, and thus, any moral status ascribed to the 
former cannot, as such, be extended to the latter. According to Himma, to have moral 
standing or status, and by that being a moral entity, is to be owed at least one direct duty. A 
direct duty is a duty that “[…] immediately concerns the being to whom the duty is owed 
[while an indirect duty] immediately concerns the treatment of something other than the 
subject to whom the duty is owed […] (Himma, 2004, p. 145, my insertion). According to 
this, I take it that, since Himma sees personal information as only describing, or referring to, 
the person, the person at best is owed by others only an indirect duty in their treatment of her 
information. Because their treatment of her information immediately concerns the treatment 
of something other than the subject to whom the duty is owed, the person, as information 
object, is dependent on the natural person (to whom the information object refers) and her 
moral status in order to be taken into moral considerations. As Himma (2004, p. 145, footnote 
2) points out, to merely be “morally considerable” in relation to the well-being of the moral 
entity (i.e. the natural person) is a much weaker claim that that of claiming the direct duty of 
others. As Himma states:  
 
My right to life, for example, is constituted in part certain obligatory constraints on 
the behavior of other moral agents; in particular, others are constrained from 
intentionally killing me unless I am culpably posing a threat of death or grievous 
bodily harm to some other right holder [something] that is merely morally 
considerable has only a right to its well being taken into consideration in the 
deliberations of moral agents (Himma, 2004, p. 145, footnote 2, my insertion, last 
italics mine).  
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Others’ indirect duties towards you are not obligatory and thus easily overridden by other 
interests. By considering personal information as only referential, and thus only to be taken 
indirectly, via the moral status of the natural person, into consideration of (moral) 
obligations, informational privacy rights are easily overridden by other moral rights defined 
by claims on direct duty. On this account personal information can only have moral value via 
an agent with moral status (whatever property this status is based upon) whereas the agent 
has intrinsic value by virtue of having the property in question, and is thus beneficiary of 
direct duties. Therefore, even a potential threat to someone’s (moral) right, or, in terms of 
Rössler, established civil rights, can be taken as reasons for overriding claims on 
informational privacy.         
 In what follows, I will provide an argument in opposition to this line of thought, by 
acknowledging the direct value of personal information and by showing the natural person 
and the informational person as a unity of moral status. Once this is acknowledged it will 
become evident that by treating (a specific kind or set of) information, one is directly treating 
the moral agent herself, and this opens up for determining obligatory (moral) duties of 
informational behaviour appropriate of the digital informational environment.   
 In Chapter 3, I argued for an informational conception of the person developed by 
Floridi (2011) where the person is to be conceived of as a multi-agent system consisting of 
three membranes of encapsulated information and informational processes, loosely combined 
as one network. As will be explained shortly, I take consciousness to be the capacity to store, 
interpret, and repurpose data and/or information in order to create or construct a unification 
of the multi-agent system’s three membranes or agents, to the effect of constructing for itself 
a separateness or detachment from the world. Bawden argues that: 
 
[…] with life we find the emergence of meaning and context. The genetic code, for 
example, allows a particular triplet of DNA bases to have the meaning that a 
particular amino acid is to be added to a protein under construction, but only in the 
context of the cell nucleus […] Further, it has become clear that the origin of life itself 
may best be viewed as an “information event”, as is the subsequent evolution of all 
life, and the development of intelligence and culture […] The crucial aspect is not the 
arrangement of materials to form the autonomy of a living creature, nor the metabolic 
processes; rather it is the initiation of information storage and communication 
between generations that marks the origin of life […]” (Bawden, 2007, p. 315-316).  
 
According to this the crucial feature of life is the capacity to store information. If 
informational processes or capacities such as the capacity to store information are crucial, 
then, since as mentioned above information is what activates these processes, the information 
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stored must play an equally important part in forming the person in question. Recalling 
Himma’s claim that the moral status of the natural person cannot be extended, as such, to the 
informational person, if views such as Bawden’s are at all plausible, that is, if the crucial 
aspect of forming the person, Mary, not necessarily is that of the arrangements of materials, 
or, in terms of Himma, molecules, but informational processes such as storing of information 
and communication, why should Mary qua molecules arranged in a particular way have 
moral status whilst Mary qua information object does not have moral status?   
 On the other hand, Himma, by emphasizing that Mary qua human being is to be 
understood as the “[…] collection of molecules arranged in a particular way […]” (2004, p. 
148) he seems to be suggesting that it is the patterns of the molecules not the molecules 
themselves that is the identifying property of Mary. On the other hand, the same arrangement 
or “patterns of organization” 32 can be interpreted as Mary qua information object. Recall, 
from Chapter 3, information object being that of data-structures and their behaviours bundled 
together in one object of information (Floridi, 2002, p. 288). The patterns of Mary qua a 
collection of particularly arranged molecules and Mary qua a collection of data structures, are 
identically organized but interpreted at different LoAs. That is, Maryn and Maryi are two 
variant understandings of MaryS (the system)33. Even though one understanding of MaryS is 
abstract and the other is concrete, they are identical to MaryS in that it is not (necessarily) the 
“physical” properties (or lack thereof) of MaryS that are her identifying properties, but her 
unique “patterns of organization” i.e. her unique information patterns. Himma is mistaken in 
assuming Maryn as MaryS and thus in making the moral status of Maryi a question of identity 
between Maryn and Maryi when it should be a question of the identity between Maryn and 
MaryS and Maryi and MaryS, where the moral status of Maryi is due to her being identical to 
MaryS.             
 As mentioned in Chapter 3, Floridi defines LoAs (Level of Abstraction) as 
frameworks through which an observer interacts with the world. Any object or system can be 
described at a range of LoAs. The observer’s LoA(s), which are adjusted and attuned 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Recall from Chapter 3, Bates (2006) defines information as ”patterns of organization,” in order to emphasize 
the all inclusiveness of the concept of information. That is, a definition of information as patterns of 
organization is to include  “[…] every physical, biological, perceptual, and cognitive pattern of organization that 
exists or is extracted by sensing beings [as well as including] the physical and biological patterns of 
organization not sensed by us […] from the atomic to the galactic, from the virus to the ecosystem” (Bates, 
2006, p. 1035).  
33 I have here been drawing on Bates (2005) who argues that although information exists independently of the 
experience of living creatures, there can be many equally true variant understandings of the same structure. A 
variant of this view, in terms of Floridi (2013, pp. 29-52) will be explained and adopted shortly. 
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according to the observer‘s interests, values etc., determines which properties of the observed 
system is given attention by the observer (Floridi, 2013, pp. 30-31). To each LoA is a 
corresponding set of available observables34, or typed, interpreted variables. A typed variable 
is, according to Floridi, “[…] a variable qualified to hold only a declared kind of data” (2013, 
p. 31). Typed variables are interpreted when they come together with a statement of what 
feature of the system the observable represents. For example, a set of data could have natural 
numbers as its type and bank account as a feature or function of the system. The higher the 
LoA the more properties of the observed object or system are eliminated or lost to the 
observer, that is, the higher the observer’s LoA of the observed, the smaller the set of 
observables available to the observer. The lower the LoA, the larger set of observables 
available to the observer, and the more detailed analysis of the system. Depending on LoA, 
any object, i.e. system can be observed and examined (Floridi, 2013, pp. 29-34). At the 
informational LoAi the system being analysed is  
 
[…] considered and treated as discrete, self-contained, encapsulated packages 
containing: […] the appropriate data structures, which constitute the nature of the 
entity in question: the current state of the object, its unique identity, and attributes; 
and […] a collection of operations, or procedures (methods), which are activated 
(invoked) by various interactions of stimuli, namely messages received from other 
objects or changes within itself and which correspondingly define how the system 
behaves or reacts to them (Floridi, 2013, pp. 105-106, italics in the original) 
 
Each LoA, through which the system is examined or observed, can provide a determinate 
analysis with a resulting model of the system in question (Floridi, 2013, p. 31). The system 
itself, however, is independent of any LoA.        
 On an informational view of the person, the self is located as information and 
informational processes in the brain (Floridi, 2011, pp. 561-562). I suggest that the self is 
present, however, as a cohesive unity of experiences, subjectively interpreted by the multi-
agent system in question, in order, in terms of Collier, to “[…] modify itself and its 
environment to enhance its survival, responding to both environmental and internal stimuli to 
modify its basic functions to increase its viability” (2004, p. 164). The self is the set of 
interpreted (and repurposed) core or nucleus information, unified and constructed into a 
coherent set of propositions or semantic information. This information is of direct value to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 As emphasized by Floridi (2013, p. 31) the term ‘observable’ is not to be confused with ‘empirically 
perceivable’, as the examined system need not be concrete but could be entirely abstract. 
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the multi-agent system in relation to constructing the subsystems into one system. By 
optimizing its behavioural unity, the system as a whole is able to maintain stability. Or in 
terms of Dennett: “Our component modules have to act in opportunistic but amazingly 
resourceful ways to produce a modicum of behavioral unity, which is then enhanced by [a] 
greater unity” (1992, italics in original, my insertion). This greater unity, which enhances our 
behavioural unity, is due to our detachment or separation from the world, which in turn, 
determines the conditions under which the self will resist both internally and externally 
generated disruptive forces35, providing the conditions for stability or mental homeostasis. 
On, the other hand, however, many models can be made of the system, making it prone to 
improper manipulations, to the effect of de-stabilizing the system.     
 As mentioned above, according to Floridi, a LoA is a specific set of typed observables 
through which the observer accesses and interacts with the environment (Floridi, 2013, p. 
41). By its utilization of semantic information in order to interpret and construct a stable 
unity of itself, the multi-agent system is detaching itself from the world, that is, the 
informational person does not stand in a direct relation with the world, but indirectly by 
interpretation. This results in the self, or the cohesive or coherent unity of the multi-agent 
system, not standing in direct relation to itself, the self never seeing the full picture of its 
system.           
 According to an informational conceptual framework, data is primary, that is, “in the 
beginning were the data” (Floridi, 2010b, p. 275). At the informational LoA then, the person 
is primarily “[…] a data–structure”–an “informational object”–composed of […] “relations” 
describable as “mind independent points of lack of uniformity”” (Floridi in Bynum, 2010, p. 
184). This means that, conceptually, at the informational LoA, the person, i.e. the multi-agent 
system, is primarily data. For instance, the emotional states of MaryS (as data structure) can 
be described as minute changes or lacks of uniformity in MaryS’s (in terms of Parker, 1974, 
quoted in Bates, 2006, p. 1033) “patterns of organization of matter and energy”. Minute 
changes of conductance across the surface of the skin of MaryS, initiated by her autonomic 
nervous system (both of which also describable as points of differences or “patterns of energy 
and matter”), can be taken as measurements of arousal and valence (which, by many 
scientists is taken as the main dimension of emotions) (Fletcher, et al., 2010). MaryS can 
then, due to being endowed with a capacity of interpretation, by information and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 According to Collier, cohesion ” […] determines the condition under which something will resist both 
externally and internally generated disruptive forces, giving the conditions for stability (2004, p. 156).   
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informational processes encapsulated within her cognitive and consciousness membranes, 
create emotional representations and semantic information from this data, for example, 
represented as a feeling of anxiety, interpreted as being afraid of the dark36. This allows 
MaryS to create a cohesive unification of the system, in that MaryS can use her data structure 
to create a model of herself as a system that is afraid of the dark, and, by that, make the 
system into a behavioural unity, in order to take appropriate action when placed in relevant 
(dark) conditions.  Since, however, semantic information requires a capacity to “[…] interpret 
something as something else” (Floridi, 2010b, p. 276), a distance between the multi-agent 
system and the world is created, to the effect that the relation between data and information is 
not exhaustive but interpreted through LoA(s). This on the other hand, leaves the system 
vulnerable, in its unification, to external interpretations or models of itself, which in turn, 
may give rise to instability in the system.         
 On the conventional (liberal) accounts of informational privacy personal information 
is taken to only be referring to and not as constitutive parts of the person. On the other hand, 
on the proposed informational account, “personal information” is related or connected to the 
data structures, i.e. multi-agent system (in that this information is extracted from the data 
structures), but are at the same time the constitutive parts of the models of the multi-agent 
system in question. That is, the system uses its own (personal) information in its analysis of 
itself with the resulting model. The system’s own model or self can be manipulated by 
external models of the system because the system’s data structures are not transparent to the 
system (i.e. itself). Personal information is constitutive parts of the models connected to the 
system, the system itself being beyond its own reach. Distribution of a system’s personal 
information is thus distribution of the (informational) person since the distribution of this 
information results in a manipulation of the model, by the external construction of new 
models, to the effect of a reconstruction of the self.       
 We are treating the person when treating her information because this information as 
well as any treatment of that information is what is constructing her. Because of this, by 
taking and using the system’s personal information, one is at the same time manipulating the 
model of the system i.e. its self, which can undermine or damage the stability of the system. 
If MaryS is not transparent to herself or Maryi (nor anyone else), and by that allowing for a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 As noted by Bawden (2007, footnote 15) (human or semantic) information in information theory is often 
equated with some composite of data and meaning. Whether semantic information is strictly reducible to data is 
not of concern in this context. See Vakarelov (2010), and Floridi (2010b) for a discussion.  
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variety of equally “good” or appropriate interpretations or models of MaryS, then Maryi can 
be conceived of as the sum of all these models37. If Maryi is the sum of all her models, then, 
any “model-making” of MaryS is a manipulation of Maryi, since every model constructed of 
MaryS results in a reconstruction of Maryi. MaryS, however, is depending on stable self-
modelling in order to optimize her functioning as a distributed system (that is, MaryS is 
depending on stable model-making for securing the behavioural unity of her components or 
parts). Too extensive external Mary-modelling would disturb the unity of MaryS by 
effectuating unlimited manipulation of the information constituting Maryi, to the effect of 
risking informational fragmentation of Maryi, and by that jeopardizing the behavioural unity 
of the components of the system Mary. For instance Mary could be fitted with wearable 
devices, such as wristbands, that monitor Mary’s emotional states by detecting minute 
changes in the electrical conductivity and temperature of Mary’s skin that are driven by 
Mary’s autonomic nervous system which functions largely below the level of consciousness. 
The wearable device can thus read emotional states of Mary that Mary did not know she was 
in. Mary could have constructed a confident-model of herself, while the device is constructing 
an anxious-model of Mary, the two contradicting models disrupting the behavioural unity of 
Mary in that, in order to function adequately, Mary might have disregarded the information 
(encapsulated within the corporeal membrane) whilst analysing her system38. Since on this 
(the informational) view, the self is a connection between data structure and interpretations of 
these data structures (i.e. information), I suggest that, if, conceptually, the multi-agent system 
primarily is encapsulated data, then, normatively, every individual piece of personal 
information is, on its own or in combination, a constitutive part of a self-unifying (coherent 
and distinctively characteristic) whole, in that this information is used by the multi-agent 
system to interpret and/or construct a coherent unity in order to maintain stability of the 
multi-agent system and by that sustaining the system, personal information thus having direct 
value to its connected system.        	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 According to Floridi, since the ultimate reality is inaccessible to us and our understanding of it is achieved by 
us constructing models, through various LoA, of the information it provides and the constraints it places upon 
our experiences, the experienced world is limited to the sum total of our models (Floridi in Bynum, 2010, p. 
183).  
38 Professor Picard has lead a team at MIT Media Lab, pioneering research in developing ‘affective wearables’, 
that is, wearable systems, equipped with biosensors such as wrists sensors and tools (such as a smartphone 
application) that detects changes in the activity of the wearer’s autonomic nervous system. These changes or 
patterns can be interpreted as representations of the wearer’s affective patterns or emotional states. These 
devices allow for long-term continuous data gathering in order to help individual understand and communicate 
their internal state changes. For reference see Fletcher, et al. (2010); and Hernandez, et al. (2013).  
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 Above I argued for the inadequacy of theories not recognizing the direct value of 
personal information, treating personal information as something separate of the person, 
leaving it to the context in which the information is collected to determine the moral value of 
such information. In the digital environment, however, all that there is, is data or information, 
and interactions within this environment become interpretable as access/alter or read/write 
activities (Floridi, 2005, p. 189). That is, interaction, within the digital environment, can be 
interpreted as requests for information and alterations of data, and it takes form of a seamless 
flow of information between informational agents or entities, all of which are created or 
constructed by computer engineers. To conclude this section, I will argue that within the 
digital informational environment, by Rössler’s account of informational privacy one risks 
ending up with standards for informational interaction that are disharmonious with the liberal 
tradition. This claim will be exemplified by making use of Wiegel, Van den Hoven, and 
Lokhorst (2005) approach to model moral constraints on interaction within the digital 
informational environment39.         
 Wiegel, Van den Hoven, and Lokhorst are looking to develop an approach on how to 
model interaction patterns within the digital informational environment that maintains 
informational privacy, by defining information (conceived of as a cluster of data structures) 
itself as an agent “[…] with desires, intentions and beliefs about its environment that is able 
to act” (Wiegel, Van den Hoven and Lokhorst, 2005, p. 253). The informational agent’s aims 
are to maintain data integrity,40 provide rightful access, and inform all those (agents) it is 
obligated to inform (Wiegel, Van den Hoven, and Lokhorst, 2005, p. 253). Whilst 
conceptualizing information itself as an agent with the capacity to interact with its 
environment, Wiegel, Van den Hoven, and Lokhorst do not recognize the person as this 
informational agent. The moral criteria for informational interaction, that is, the criteria for 
what can be rightfully accessed or altered by what informational agent is not the direct value 
of personal information, but the relation between attributes of the requested information, the 
requesting agent’s role, and the extent of which the requiring agent’s role is assigned both to 
the sphere in which the requested information originated, and its sphere of intended use. Data 
integrity is maintained by restricting distribution and use of information to and within 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Although not mentioning autonomy as a justifying value, this approach is compatible with the liberal 
accounts considered above when looking to construct interaction patterns in a digital informational environment 
that maintains the “concrete” person’s informational privacy. 
40 I assume that what is meant by integrity in this context is just that of keeping data from improper alterations 
(Brazier et al., 2004, p. 19-20). 
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domains defined by the spheres attached to the particular role of the information i.e. agent, as 
either data-subject (personal data and/or information), data-administrator (data manipulator), 
or stakeholder, operating within the domain in question. The spheres specify the particular 
value or purpose of their information by being defined according to need and custom. To 
prevent the use of a particular good with the purpose of gaining dominance in a different 
sphere, the information gained in a particular sphere cannot be used for a purpose other than 
the purpose specified in this particular sphere. The separate spheres make up the 
informational society or environment within which the informational agents interact. As a 
general rule, information assigned the role of data-subject has the right to access and 
distribute its own data (Wiegel, Van den Hoven, and Lokhorst, 2005, pp. 253-255). By this I 
take the information as data-subject to have unrestricted access and distributions rights. On 
the other hand, the data-subject does not have the right to change its own data as this right 
belongs to a data-administrator. In addition to unrestricted access and distribution rights, the 
data-subject also has an obligation to distribute information requested by data-administrators 
and stakeholders within its “intended application domain.” The data-administrator, on the 
other hand, is responsible for the correctness of the data in question and has obligations to 
alter data in accordance with the restrictions accompanying its role and domain (Wiegel, Van 
den Hoven, and Lokhorst, 2005, pp. 253-255).      
 Rössler, as mentioned in section 4.1, argues that, in order to determine when what 
data becomes worthy of protection and when it is legitimately accessed, one has to look, 
through a normative horizon of expectations (guaranteeing civil liberties), at the contexts of 
when data protection becomes significant (Rössler, 2005, p. 119, 124). Van den Hoven states 
similarly, that “[t]he […] value of information is local and allocation schemes and local 
practices that distribute access to information should accommodate local meanings and 
should, therefore, be associated with specific spheres” (2008, pp. 314, italics in the original). 
Violations of privacy is “[…] construed as the morally impropriate transfer of personal data 
across the boundaries of what we intuitively think of as separate […] spheres of access” (Van 
den Hoven, 2008, pp. 314). Similarly, Rössler argues that the capturing, collecting, and 
storing of personal data or information, by state institutions, concerning an individual person 
is not in itself a bad thing. On the contrary, the idea of individual rights and the possibility of 
making claims according to such rights, naturally and necessarily entail the identification of 
individuals. Such activity, by state institutions, can be the endeavour, by the state, to achieve 
equality among its citizens. Such activity, however, according to Rössler, gives rise to the 
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danger of shifting personal information from one context to another and by that permitting 
new classifications that may lead to discriminations against the person thus classified 
(Rössler, 2005, p. 126). In both of the above accounts, the legitimacy of the motives is what 
justifies access and collection. On these accounts, it is not the kind of information, i.e. the 
kind of information that has a direct moral relevance in relation to a specific, informational 
person (or in other words personal information) as such, but the context in which this 
information is accessed, which determines the value of, or the right to, informational 
privacy.41           
 Contrary to Benn and Rössler’s accounts of informational privacy, Wiegel, Van den 
Hoven and Lokhorst’s (2005) “approach to modelling moral constraints in complex 
informational relationships” does not make any reference to the value of autonomy. Where 
personal information is seen as the separate passive product of an autonomous person in 
Benn and Rössler’s accounts of informational privacy, the same approach can be said to 
represent the flip side of the coin also, in that it seems to result in some sort of informational 
outsourcing. The (autonomous) human agent is left passive, separated from its information, 
which seems to be living its own life through patterns of informational interaction 
constructed by computer scientists or engineers. Personal information is, within the 
informational environment constructed by Wiegel, Van den Hoven and Lokhorst (2005), 
assigned the role of data-subject with unrestricted access and distribution rights to/of its data, 
within the sphere of interests it is allocated to. Since distribution and access is constrained to 
and within separate spheres, the human agent is able to estimate who has what information 
about her. Her expectations concerning what knowledge others have about her are secured 
from inaccuracy by preventing transference of data, of the data subject, to a different sphere, 
and by the data-administrator’s obligation to inform the data-subject of any changes it makes 
to the data (-subject). The human agent, through her representative data-subject i.e. personal 
information, thus controls, or rather, has an opportunity to monitor, what other people know 
about her and who those agents are to which its information is distributed (by knowing their 
representative agent’s roles as either data-subject, data-administrator or stakeholder). The 
“natural” person’s informational privacy is maintained by separating personal information 
from the person and containing this information safely within the sphere it is allocated to. 
The person’s autonomy in self-presentation is intact since the strict containment of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 On Rössler’s account the context must be in accordance with autonomy (2005, pp. 119-129), while Wiegel, 
Van den Hoven, and Lokhorst (2005) makes no reference to the value of autonomy. 
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information within the spheres, preserves the person’s undisrupted well-defined normative 
horizons of expectation of what others might know about her, that, according to Rössler 
(2005, p. 114), is “necessary for the exercise of autonomy”.      
    In Wiegel, Van den Hoven, and Lokhorst’s (2005) approach to modelling moral 
constraints in informational interactions, we are, in the digital informational environment, 
existing as more or less free floating fragmented informational objects or agents. “Natural” 
encapsulation of information is eliminated and because of this elimination of encapsulation, 
access is unrestricted. The unlimited access is then remedied by the encapsulation of personal 
information on a criterion of “spheres of justice” or “spheres of access” such as spheres of 
national security, medical interests, etc., and not on a criterion of self-unification. 
Considering that our interactions increasingly take place within the digital environment, 
which perhaps (in the future) is to become the main arena for human interaction, on this 
approach, by not considering our informational unity and self-unification as morally relevant 
in creating the digital environment, the moral principles by which to constrain interaction, in 
(potentially) our main arena of interaction, are to be based on a conception of personal 
information as a mere resource. With the moral criterion for informational interaction being 
that of fair or just distribution of social goods, and not the informational integrity of the 
person, we (as personal information) are to be considered as the means for such distribution. 
This, although perhaps compatible with the liberal conception of informational privacy as the 
right to control access, seems nevertheless at odds with the liberal tradition of the integrity of 
the person of never letting oneself be used as a mere means. If, on the other hand, the 
informational environment was to be constructed on a moral criterion grounded on the direct 
value of personal information in relation to the informational person, and thus on the right to 
informational integrity, moral principles for informational interaction will be more in tune 
with the liberal tradition.  
 
 
4.3 The Inverse Function as the “Determinator” of 
Personal Information  
In the previous section, I argued for the moral status of the informational person by showing 
that the distinction between the natural and informational person is a matter of difference in 
LoAs and not a difference in properties. The moral status (of being a moral entity, that is, an 
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entity owed respect) ascribed one, can thus be ascribed the other. Moral status should be 
extended to the informational person when the direct value of personal information is 
recognized. Personal information has a direct value in relation to the multi-agent system, in 
that each individual piece of information that is a member of the unique set of the system in 
question is used by the multi-agent system to construct an informative and coherent unity, 
consistent with its data-structure, in order to maintain stability. Personal information thus has 
direct value for the system in being a constitutive and stabilizing part of a self-unifying 
whole.            
 In section 4.1, I argued that, in order to provide for adequate criteria for the content of 
informational privacy rights, due to the fact that informational interactions to a greater and 
greater extent take place within the informational environment by means of new ICTs, 
informational privacy rights must be grounded on the direct or fundamental value of personal 
information in relation to the stability of the multi-agent system, rather than via the 
fundamental value of autonomy. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, by a core or 
nucleus set of information, I mean that information that could not be constitutive of another 
set, that is, that information, either as a single piece of information or in combination, that is 
unique to a particular informational person. In this section, I will give an account for how the 
content of the core or nucleus set of information is to be determined, or in other words, how 
to determine what is to count as personal information. This set will be established as the 
centre of the system’s self-unification.        
 In order to determine the content of the nucleus set of information of an informational 
person I will argue in favour of, and elaborate on, Floridi’s (2013, p. 311) suggestion of the 
inverse function in determining what information is constitutive of the person. I will begin 
with bringing in the account of Al-Fedaghi (2005) on how personal or (in terms of Al-
Fedaghi) private information is to be calculated. This account is in line with conventional 
theories, including those of Benn and Rössler, in that what is being considered as the 
essential property of personal or private information is its referring role. When reference is 
considered determinant of personal information, the information that counts as personal 
information is too comprehensive and additional conditions is required for determining its 
value. The advantage of the inverse function is that it excludes any contingent or peripheral 
information and personal information is limited to that information that is of direct value to 
the informational person, the problems that arise due to trivial information being included as 
personal information in considerations of informational privacy rights, are thus avoided.  
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 Al-Fedaghi (2005)42, in developing a “theoretical formalism to specify private 
information”, suggests a set theoretic approach in order to determine or calculate what 
information is to count as personal or, in terms of Al-Fedaghi, private information. According 
to Al-Fedaghi (2005), by utilizing “[…] single-referent linguistic assertions in defining 
“private information” in terms of ‘atomicity’ and identification […]”, a person’s atomic 
private information, or private assertions (assertions with one recognizable referent), is 
recognized and the person’s private information can then be calculated. For example, ‘Mary 
has brown eyes’ is an atomic private assertion of Mary and thus private information. ‘Mary 
and John are brother and sister and both have brown eyes’ is a compound private information 
assertion but can be reduced to ‘Mary has brown eyes’, ‘Mary has a brother’, ’Mary is a 
sister’, ‘John has brown eyes’, and so on. The set of private information can thus be defined 
as “[…] the set of every assertion that has a single referent that signifies a single individual 
[person]” (Al-Fedaghi, 2005, my insertion). The subsets of this set being   
 
[…] the set of pieces of atomic private information of an individual [this set in turn 
having as its subsets] the set of pieces of atomic private information that is in the 
possession of others [and] the set of pieces of atomic private information that is only 
known by the proprietor [and] the set of pieces of private information of other 
individuals that is in the possession of an individual, however, he/she is not its 
proprietor” (Al-Fedaghi, 2005, my insertions).  
 
According to the above, the strict measure of what is private information is identifiability. Al-
Fedaghi, however, recognizes that this notion of private information is too encompassing in 
determining what information is to count as worthy of protection, in that most of the 
information included in a person’s set of private information is ordinary and trivial (Al-
Fedaghi, 2005; 2006). Al-Fedaghi is thus forced to introduce a sensitivity condition of private 
information. The term ‘private information sensitivity’ expresses, according to Al-Fedaghi, a 
notion of information sensitivity by degree, and an approach to determine its degree of 
‘sensitivity’ or ‘privacy-ness’ “[…] that involves a linguistic inquiry to discover the 
‘tendencies’ of different types of private information to ignite different levels of sensitivity” 
(Al-Fedaghi, 2005). I appreciate that Al-Fedaghi’s theoretical formalism only is set forth as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 In Al-Fedaghi (2005; 2006) a person’s set of private information is purely referential to a natural person (a 
human being). Al-Fedaghi, thus, prefer the term ‘private information’ to ‘personal information’ since he 
understand ‘personal’ to imply “ownership as in personal property”, while ‘private information’ has 
connotations of a distinction between proprietorship and possessor. The proprietorship of the information can be 
other that its possessor.    
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descriptive clarification of what private information is, and not as a normative or “value 
theory” of personal information and informational privacy. However, by claiming that “[t]he 
sensitivity thresholds of applicability are a pragmatic concern” (Al-Fedaghi, 2005) and not a 
theoretical one, what pieces of information are to be valued out of the totality of private 
information is indeterminate and dependent on additional conditions such as, for example, 
social and cultural norms, conventions, and interests. Al-Fedaghi’s definition of private 
information is thus rather self-evident and of little use without also giving an account for the 
content of sensitive private information. What is needed is a way to isolate the core or 
nucleus information constitutive of the person from the trivial or periphery information only 
contingently relation to the person.        
 Floridi (2013, pp. 309-312) briefly suggests the inverse function as the determinant of 
what information is to count as constitutive of the person. A function represents a special 
kind of relation where every object a from the domain is related to the value of the function 
at a. That is, a function is a rule or process that assign a unique object b to any object a from 
the domain of the function, the value of the function at a (Hrbacek and Jech, 1999, p. 23). 
The inverse function states that for each x ∈ X, x is related to a different y ∈ Y and for every y 
∈ Y there is an x ∈ X such that ƒ(x) =y. According to Floridi: “The obvious but powerful 
property that the inverse function enjoys is that of uniquely identifying the input x of another 
function based only on its output y, for all y ∈ Y. In plain English, a function leads you from x 
to y and an inverse function leads you back, from y to x” (2013, p. 311). The inverse function 
uniquely leads you back to the originate set, and a distinction can be made between core or 
nucleus information and periphery information. The set of trivial or periphery information of 
an informational person is the set of information that, either as individual pieces of 
information or collectively, does not signify any unique properties of the informational 
system in question (i.e. person). This set includes information such as: eye colour, hair 
colour, height, age, gender, address, phone number, name, and so on. Although the 
information in this set refers to the person in question, this information is either contingent or 
non-exclusive to the person. The core or nucleus set, on the other hand, is that information 
(i.e. patterns of organization) that, either as single pieces of information or in combination, is 
uniquely connected to a particular multi-agent system. That is, any information or patterns of 
organization that is, signifies, or represents some unique property of the person. Elements or 
information of this set include “patterns of organization” of distinct qualities, tendencies, and 
behaviour such as: medical records, retina patterns, DNA, life-style, belief system, interests, 
	  	   65	  
etc.             
 As mentioned in section 4.2, what is important when it comes to an informational 
ontology, is arrangement or patterns of organization. In terms of Floridi “[…] we are 
homeostatic information patterns, bent on restricting all forms of entropy […]” (2013, p. 
310). Maryi is a set of patterns of organization, i.e. information, some of which are 
constitutive of Maryi. The patterns constitutive of Mary are elements of Mary’s core or 
nucleus set of information. The core or nucleus set of Mary is the subset, of MaryS,, 
consisting of those elements i.e. pieces of information that constitute the distinct and 
characteristic patterns of organization, together called Mary. Although an output can 
drastically differ in representation43 from its input, the inverse function takes you back from 
the patterns of organization of the output to the original patterns of organization of the input. 
Elements included in the nucleus set of information are thus any patterns of organization, 
copied in one form or another, that by the inverse function, lead back to a pattern of 
organization of the multi-agent system in question.       
 By this, I suggest the inverse function as the function for determining the content of 
the nucleus set of information by indicating the information propinquity44 of this information 
in relation to its multi-agent system. Information propinquity indicates the constitutive 
function of this information. For instance, “Mary has brown eyes” is not an element of 
MaryC, since there are probably multiple brown eyed (multi-agent) systems named Mary. On 
the other hand, any representation of the exact/original/unique pattern of pigments of MaryS’s 
iris, would be an element of this set, since, by the inverse function, the pattern of organization 
or information of any (copied) representation would uniquely lead back to the originate set, 
and would thus be an element of this set. In other words, the core or nucleus set of Mary is 
the sum of patterns of qualities, patterns of behaviour, and patterns of tendencies that are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 By representation I will make use of Bates’ (2006) definition of represented information as “natural 
information that is encoded or embodied”. According to Bates, “[e]ncoded information is natural information 
that has symbolic, linguistic, and/or signal-based patterns of organization. Embodied information is the 
corporeal expression or manifestation of information previously in encoded form” (Bates, 2006, p. 1035). This 
is different from Floridi in that Bates considers all information as natural information, while Floridi (2010b) 
distinguish semantic information from natural information. As mentioned above, however, the discussion of 
whether or not all information are strictly reducible to natural information, is, in the present context, not crucial, 
what is important is that the same pattern of organization can be represented and copied in multiple forms. 
44 By Information propinquity I do not mean physical closeness, but something similar to “functional 
propinquity” (Korzenny, (1978) defines functional propinquity as presence across long distances in that 
functional propinquity is what diminish the impact of physical separation). In relation to the multi-agent system, 
information propinquity is what diminishes the impact of the separateness of the subsystems on the system. It is 
the condition for the system’s self-unification, that is, information propinquity is the multi-agent system’s 
perceived unity of its distributed subsystems.  
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forming the characteristic arrangement that is MaryS. A person’s name, on the other hand, is 
not personal or constitutive information. Collecting, copying, and/or, distributing the name 
‘Mary’ is not to collect, copy, and/or distribute information of MaryC since ‘Mary’ does not 
uniquely lead back to this set but is an element of every person called or named ‘Mary’ Even 
if MaryS was the only multi-agent system called ‘Mary’, so that ‘Mary’ would exclusively 
lead back to MaryPeriphery, ‘Mary’ would not qualify for membership in MaryC, because the 
unique relation in this case is coincidental ‘Mary’ is contingent to MaryS and is not a pattern 
of  her distinctive qualities, behaviour, or tendencies, that is, ‘Mary’ is not an element of 
MaryC.            
 The detailed patterns of a person’s energy consumption; collected by smart metering 
systems and distributed through a digital network; could be constitutive information of the 
person in question. According to the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS)(2012), 
with smart meters it will be possible to read and record energy consumption with up to fifteen 
minutes intervals, to the effect of a significant increase in the amount of available energy 
consumption data. EDPS states that   
 
[w]ith data at such granularity, those who have access to smart metering data can 
know when each individual appliance in a household is turned on and off, and can 
often also identify what specific appliances are used. Smart meters can also provide a 
detailed breakdown of energy usage over a long period of time, which can show 
pattern of use […] deployment of smart metering may lead to tracking everyday lives 
of people in their own homes and building detailed profiles of all individuals based on 
their domestic activities […] Patterns can be tracked at the level of individual 
households but also for many households, taken together, aggregated, and sorted by 
area, demographics and so on. Profiles can thus be developed, and then applied back 
to individual households and individual members of those households (EDPS, 2012).  
 
With personal or constitutive information being patterns of distinct qualities, behaviour, and 
tendencies, it is not, in my opinion, with regard to smart metering, unreasonable to assume 
that information patterns of energy consumption can uniquely correspond with information 
patterns i.e. patterns of organization, that constitute the energy consuming person, since it is 
the arrangements and not the fabric, so to speak, that make up the person. The detailed 
patterns of energy consumption can thus be considered as a copy of the original patterns of 
organization i.e. the person, whenever these patterns of organization i.e. information 
exclusively lead back to the originate set. Lisovich and Wicker (2008) claim that: “[…] the 
detailed household consumption data gathered by advanced metering projects can […] be 
repurposed […] to reveal personally identifying information such as an individual’s 
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activities, preferences, and even beliefs”. Accordingly, it could be possible to move, for 
example, from Mary’s distinct qualities, tendencies, and behaviour to Mary’s household 
energy consumption information and back to uniquely identifying such properties of Mary 
from this information45, this information should thus be considered elements of the core or 
nucleus set of Maryi. The core or nucleus set of Maryi, being Mary’s centre of unification by 
being the set of observables, through which, Mary, the multi-agent system, unify, by 
constructing models of herself.  
 
 
4.4 The Harm in Taking MaryC  
As argued in section 4.2, in order to maintain stability or homeostasis of the multi-agent 
system, that is, to ensure the most beneficial interactions between the subsystems (i.e. 
between a corporeal, a cognitive, and a consciousness membrane) of the multi-agent system, 
the system or informational person, Maryi, must engage in the self-unifying activity of 
interpreting her own data structures. This activity is that of making models of herself that are 
the results of an analysis of the multi-agent system through a first-person LoA by information 
and informational processes encapsulated within the three membranes (and most importantly 
within the consciousness membrane). By virtue of this activity, Maryi, is separating or 
detaching herself from the world, in order to resist disruptive external forces. This separation 
results, however, in Maryi, neither standing in a direct relation to the world, nor to herself.  
Thus, when “natural” encapsulation is eliminated, this separation results in the system being 
vulnerable to the disruptive or manipulative external forces that the separation was supposed 
to resist. Recall from Chapter 2 the privacy concerns relating to life-logging, where “life-log” 
refers to “[…] a comprehensive multimedia archive of an individual’s quotidian existence, 
aided by pervasive computing technologies” (Allen, 2011, p. 163). The life-log can 
prospectively store data “[…] pertaining to biological states derived from continuous self-
monitoring of, for example, heart rate, respiration, blood sugar, blood pressure, and arousal” 
(Allen, 2011, p. 164). The storage potential for information of a life-log can be much more 
extensive than the storage potential of the consciousness membrane. Because of the change 
from an analogue to a digital environment, it is no longer obvious that the first person LoA is 
the most extensive. A multi-agent system’s life-log can be the third-person LoA of the system 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 This example has partly been borrowed from Floridi (2013, p. 311). 
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in question. Since this LoA can contain a larger set of observables that the first-person LoA, 
the information propinquity of the multi-agent system can be disrupted in that external 
informational entities can make more detailed models of the system than the system itself. A 
multi-agent system’s capacity for self-unification is diminished in that a larger core or 
nucleus set of the system in question can be unified externally to the originate system.  
 By self-unification, I suggest the informational person as a self-unifying 46 
informational agent. The informational person has the capacity to self-unification insofar it is 
able to construct and sustain itself as an informational person i.e. is able to internally 
construct stable, coherent, models of itself from its core or nucleus set of information 
encapsulated within its consciousness membrane extracted from its data structures. This can 
only be achieved by unifying its information by means of the proper degree of encapsulation 
without the threat of improper or unauthorized external manipulation or alteration to the core 
or nucleus information of the informational person. This means that all elements of the core 
or nucleus set of information, encapsulated within the consciousness membrane is prima 
facie worthy of respect and protection. The onus of justification is accordingly always on 
those who claim or require access to the core or nucleus set of information of an 
informational person.           
 In this section, I will thus argue that the harm in taking MaryC, is in subjecting Maryi, 
to disruption of information propinquity or self-unification through improper external 
manipulation of her core or nucleus information. I will argue for informational integrity as 
the moral criterion for what information is to count as worthy of protection, and then ground 
the right to informational integrity or informational privacy rights on the fundamental or 
direct value of personal information. The direct value of personal information will then be 
claimed as the foundation for inferring moral principles of informational behaviour. 
 According to Collier any autonomous47 system “[…] uses its own information to 
modify itself in order to enhance its survival […]” (2004, p. 164). According to the account 
of the person as a multi-agent system (consisting of a corporeal, a cognitive, and a 
consciousness membrane), this capacity is effectuated and optimized by the consciousness 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 I have borrowed this term from Matthews (2008, p. 156), however, on my account, self-unification is not to 
be considered as the capacity to ”[…] constructing the right kind of self narrative we regard as valuable” 
(Matthews, 2008, p. 156), but simply as the capacity to the right level of informational detachment or separation 
in order to maintain a unified set of information free from improper alterations.  
47 ‘Autonomous’ here meaning an ability to change state by performing internal transitions (Floridi, 2013, p. 
140). 
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membrane’s encapsulation of semantic information and informational processes such that the 
observed system can be the same as the system of the observer. By this, the system can make 
models of itself in order to optimize the interactions between its own agents so as to maintain 
the stability of the whole system and enhance its survival. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the 
historically presupposed, essential privileged self-understanding of the person must be 
rejected on both philosophical and scientific grounds with the realization that there is no 
metaphysical boundary between mind and body (Alfino and Mayes, 2003). McGeer suggests 
that, although the means for gaining information about oneself and others may differ, the 
kind of information gained in both cases is the same, the difference between a first- and third-
person perspective being that of the amount in information gathered. Our first-person 
authority rests on our judgements of ourselves being based on a greater amount of 
information, or in other words, on a more detailed set of information than the judgements 
others make of us (McGeer, 1996, p. 500). This, however, means that we do not necessarily 
have privileged access to the unique (i.e. our own) information that guarantees our 
individuality (Alfino and Mayes, 2003).        
 In informational terms, first-person authority depends on there being two 
informational sub LoAs. The first-person LoAi being lower than a third-person LoAi, in that 
the set of observables available in the first-person LoAi is more detailed than the available set 
of observables in the third-person LoAi. This provides the systems with the capacity to make 
models of itself that are robust to external (and internal) informational fluctuations that might 
disrupt its informational integrity, and by that provide stability to the system. In pre-digital 
time, the person’s informational unification was naturally sheltered from massive or invasive 
forces that may interrupt the system’s privileged self-understanding or -unification, by the 
encapsulations of information within the membranes that provided it with its essential first-
person LoAi. When, however, such encapsulation, within the digital environment, is 
diminished, although the means for collecting and unifying information in order to construct 
models of oneself or others might still differ, the two sub LoAis may converge. Analysis from 
the first-person LoAis needs no longer be lower or more detailed than analysis made from the 
third-person LoAi, and the multi-agent system is prone to external disruptive forces.   
 In line with Rössler (2005, p. 126), the EDPS (2012) considers the concerns relating 
to informational privacy, as the risk of de-anonymized information being distributed outside 
its sphere of interest to third parties who may use this information for other purposes than 
that what it was collected for in the first place, namely that of energy conservation. The vast 
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amount of data collected through smart metering allow external construction of detailed 
profiles or models of the person, in this case, Maryi, in order to serve the interests of third 
parties. For instance, law enforcement agencies, insurance companies, tax authorities, 
landlords, employers etc. may all have interest in gaining information about Mary’s energy 
consumption (EDPS, 2012).         
 Rössler (2005, pp. 126-127) claims that protection of informational privacy is 
colliding with an elementary right, namely that of looking at the world as and when one 
wants. Rössler sees conflicts involving protection of informational privacy as conflicts 
between interests in anonymity and “de-anonymization”. These conflicts are thus conflicts 
between interests in liberty, that is, conflicts between “wanting to know” and “wanting to 
hide”. To determine when which of these interests in liberty is to overtrump the other, the 
normative crux being “[…] to what extent it is acceptable for one person’s profit to be at the 
expense of another’s de-anonymization” (Rössler, 2005, p. 128). A balanced assessment must 
thus be made of  
 
[w]hat aspects of a person’s life are affected by such a restriction on her informational 
self-determination, and, more generally, what social practices? How likely is it to 
result in an actual reduction in the person’s freedom? How far will the individual’s 
everyday existence (as opposed to exceptional situations) be affected? (Rössler, 2005, 
p. 128) 
 
What is lacking in Rössler’s (as in most) account of the right to informational privacy, is a 
sufficient division between types of information. Although Rössler distinguish four groups of 
privacy relevant information or data48, personal information is not considered valuable as 
such, but only becomes worthy of protection, relative to a “ […] context in which data 
protection or the protection of informational privacy acquires significance” (Rössler, 2005, p. 
124, italics in the original). By this, Mary’s claim to her own personal information is to be 
considered relative to any interested third parties and their motives for collecting and 
possessing the very same information. The determinative point being that of the estimated 
impact of external collecting and possession of information about Mary, on Mary’s everyday 
life in relation to her established civil liberties. By, however, recognizing the impact of the 
“information revolution” 49  on Mary’s everyday life, in that, as mentioned above, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 See footnote 28 above for an overview of these groups. 
49 Floridi refer to the information revolution as the acceptance of the idea “[…] that we are not standalone and 
unique entities, but rather informationally embodied organisms […], mutually connected and embedded in an 
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development of new ICTs is, so to speak, changing the rules of the game, one will realize that 
the conflicts involved in protection of informational privacy no longer is a conflict between 
“wanting to know” and “wanting to hide”. That is, it is not a conflict between wanting 
anonymity and wanting de-anonymization, but a conflict between unification and de-
unification. As mentioned above, from an informational viewpoint, through smart metering 
of Mary’s energy consumption, Maryi, is integrated into a digital network through the 
patterns of organization of Mary’s energy consumption, that, by the inverse function, can 
(due to the possibility to collect finely grained, detailed data of Mary’s energy consumption) 
lead back to patterns of organization (information) of the core or nucleus set of information 
of Mary. When Mary is integrated into the digital environment, Mary’s “natural” protection, 
i.e. encapsulation is diminished, and her control over access is more or less non-existent. 
Rössler says that  
 
The problems arising with new technologies and the associated possibilities for 
surveillance of course go beyond the realm of individual information control and 
extend to the sorts of democratically delegated, state control that people (must be able 
to) rely upon for the protection of their informational privacy (Rössler, 2005, p. 118, 
italics in the original). 
   
These problems, however, are due to the de-encapsulation of personal information within the 
digital environment. If the impact of de-encapsulation is not fully recognized by accounts of 
informational privacy, the democratic state does not have, by the traditional liberal concepts 
of personal information and informational privacy, a relevant understanding of the value of 
personal information. By recognizing the person as information, the direct value of personal 
information becomes apparent, and adequate context independent principles of the rightful 
treatment of personal information can be adopted.      
 As argued in the previous chapter, on an informational account, personhood is to be 
conceived as the encapsulation of information of the multi-agent system i.e. person at the 
level of consciousness. From an informational view, this means the system is capable of self-
interpretation by adapting or repurposing information and analysing herself through a first-
person LoAi, to the effect of detaching or separating herself from nature, and through this 
separation the self emerges (Floridi, 2011). The informational person is unifying or 
differentiating herself from others by encapsulating, and, by that, unifying her core or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
informational environment, the infosphere, which we share with both natural and artificial agents similar to us 
in many respects” (Floridi, 2010c, p. 11)  
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nucleus information of the consciousness membrane to the effect of separating herself-set 
from the world. Due to the separation from its external environment, the “world” the system 
must integrate into, is a world of meanings and interpretations autonomously constructed by 
the “collaborative and cumulative effort by generations through time” (Floridi, 2011, p. 560). 
This world is thus a world of models. Although the person may be dependent on others in 
order to integrate herself into this world, the self emerges from its separation from nature 
(Floridi, 2014, pp. 92-93), keeping the information secure from unwanted or improper 
alterations that will disrupt the unity, and separation or detachment of the self-set is thus 
crucial.  When the person is conceived of as constitutively made of information, any changes 
in her information will alter the informational person herself. A person can thus be altered 
either directly, by external informational agents or entities making changes in this 
information by copying/collecting, storing, editing, distributing etc. the information in 
question, or indirectly, by the informational entity adding, adapting or repurposing 
information received, by the informational person, from external informational entities, and 
by that indirectly being altered by the external informational agent or entity in question.
 When Mary is integrated into the digital environment, in this case through a 
networked smart meter, copies of Mary’s core or nucleus information can be made and freely 
distributed throughout the digital environment. By this, Mary as an information object has 
been manipulated, irrespective of who or what collected, copied, stored, or distributed her, 
and their motives for doing this. When information or elements of the core or nucleus set are 
copied, these are, strictly speaking, no longer numerically identical, to the effect of divisions 
being made of Mary in the digital environment, and Mary has become informationally 
fragmented. Any such manipulation of Maryi, is at the risk of destabilizing MaryS, recall that 
Mary as an information object is stabilized by a unification into a self of the multi-agent 
system, by the system, i.e. Mary, making internally coherent models of herself. Since the 
overall stability of the system is maintained by coherence between the system’s semantic 
interpretations of its own system (by making the three agents of the system working together 
as one unit), the more extensive opportunities of external manipulation, the greater the risk of 
making Maryi incoherent.          
 By it being possible to conceptualize the person as a self-unifying or distributed 
multi-agent system of informational agents, it seems appropriate that some value should also 
be attached to the information itself, in order to protect the informational person from 
improper alterations by external informational agents. The concept of the person as 
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constitutively informational, gives the opportunity to make a clear normative distinction 
between two types of information. As defined at the beginning of this chapter, morally 
relevant information is information with direct moral relevance in relation to the 
informational person. Morally “irrelevant” information on the other hand is only morally 
relevant indirectly in relation to the person, in that information in terms of knowledge can 
characteristically be valued as an end by an evaluator. Informational privacy rights are 
justified on the direct value of personal information. More precisely, the first-person LoAi is 
the person’s core or nucleus set of information. This LoAi should, due to being of direct value 
to the informational person (the nucleus set is the set being the set of observables through 
which the system construct itself, i.e. its models of itself), be considered morally relevant. 
First-person LoAi, i.e. the morally relevant set of observables, indicates that the system under 
observation is the same as the system of the observer. Our normatively privileged LoAi of our 
own system is “naturally” protected by encapsulation of the consciousness membrane in 
order to maintain stability. That is, the mechanism of self-unification that maintains 
coherence of the informational self is the encapsulation of information and informational 
processes provided by the consciousness membrane. ”External” models resulting from a 
third-person LoAi (i.e. set of observables) may disrupt the coherence of the originate set, and 
the more detailed third-person LoAi, the greater the risk of disrupting coherence.   
 As argued above, the value of personal information is relevant to the multi-agent 
system due to the particular constitutive relation it has to its own personal information. When 
this relation is realized, any treatment of its constitutive information is a treatment of the 
multi-agent person herself. Any treatment of personal information is that of manipulation, 
and any manipulation of the system’s personal information is a manipulation of the system 
itself, in that, manipulation of the personal or constitutive information of the system is a 
manipulation of the model which is supposed to promote its (the system’s) stability. Within 
the digital informational environment, the multi-agent system’s “natural” protection against 
improper manipulation is diminished or eliminated. In order to minimize the risk of 
informational disruption, the informational person is dependent on informational agents’ 
obligation regarding the treatment of her constitutive or personal information. Since the 
informational person, constitutively, is his or her own personal information, informational 
obligations owed the informational person, are obligations owed the information itself. That 
is, as informational agents we have some direct duties regarding our treatment of personal 
information.            
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 As mentioned above, what is to count as personal information is determined by the 
inverse function of a set. This means that informational agents50 have duties regarding the 
treatment of any information that can, by the inverse function, strictly be led back to a 
specific/unique multi-agent system (consisting on the three membranes mentioned above). 
For instance, in terms of Himma,  
 
[a person’s] right to life […] is constituted in part by certain obligatory constraints on 
the behavior of other moral agents; in particular, others are constrained from 
intentionally killing [a person] unless [she] is culpably posing a threat of death or 
grievous bodily harm to some other rights-holder (Himma, 2004, footnote 2, my 
insertions) 
 
That is, the onus of justification is always on the killer because the act of killing is that of 
subjecting the system in question to an external disruptive, or rather, destructive force. Third 
parties’ manipulation of personal information is in the same manner (at least to a certain 
degree) an external disruptive force taking action on the multi-agent system in question. The 
onus of justification of informational disruption should therefore always rest on the external 
manipulator. A person’s right to informational privacy is thus to be established on an 
obligatory restriction on the informational behaviour of collecting, copying, storing and 
distributing elements of external core or nucleus sets of information. By this, informational 
privacy is provided the comprehensive protection Benn (1988) and Rössler (2005) sought 
after in the value of autonomy, in that informational privacy is not only to be taken into 
consideration due to the person’s right in having its well-being taken into consideration in 
deliberations of external treatment of personal information. On the other hand, being 
grounded on the informational nature of the person, personal information is provided with a 
more robust protection than the theories of informational privacy rights based on the value of 
autonomy can provide. By being of direct moral value, personal information places, 
independently of context, obligatory constraints on external agents’ informational behaviour. 
 As mentioned above, improper or unauthorized external alteration or manipulation of 
information protected by informational privacy rights is any collecting, copying, storing, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Defining what informational agents are to count as moral agents is not of concern here. I do suggest, 
however, that as computer scientists and engineers are moral informational agents, as are all other multi-agent 
systems (consisting of the three membranes), those who create and construct the (digital) informational 
environment are under obligation to construct any artificial informational agents and patterns of interaction in 
the informational environment in consistency with obligations to informational behaviour, as well as every 
multi-agent system having their personal “informational” duties.  
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distributing, and editing of this information, since such activities can disrupt the unity of the 
set. Floridi states that informational privacy is to be considered as the fundamental and 
inalienable right to  
 
[…] immunity from unknown, undesired, or unintentional changes in one’s own 
identity as an informational entity both actively and passively. Actively, because 
collecting, storing, reproducing, manipulating, etc. one’s information amounts now to 
two stages in stealing, cloning or breeding someone else’s personal identity. 
Passively, because breaching one’s informational privacy may now consist in forcing 
someone to acquire unwanted data, thus altering her or his nature as an informational 
entity without consent (Floridi, 2013, pp. 243-244).  
 
Similarly, I have suggested a definition of the right to informational privacy as the 
fundamental right to informational integrity. Since this set is what constitutes the self, the 
unity of this set is worthy of protection insofar as it sustains the informational agent in 
question, that is, the multi-agent system. Informational privacy is, then, understood as the 
state of self-unification, that is, as the state of being a unified set of information by enjoying 
the right degree of separation or detachment from the world. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the capacity for storing information in the original set is limited. This gives rise to 
the possibility, by the unlimited capacity of external informational entities for storing 
information, of copied self-sets being larger than itself. When distribution also is unlimited, 
the unauthorized copy can then be distributed, not only to other regions of the informational 
environment, but back to the original set, and by that unauthorized parts are added to the 
original set in question. This will infringe upon the set’s self-unification, by implementing 
disorder and inconsistency into the system in question, both by making unique information 
non-unique by copying (and distributing) it to other regions of the “world,” and by that 
decreasing its detachment or separateness from the world. The set’s self-unification can also 
be reduced by the ability to distribute back to the original set, either deleted information or 
information the originator would like to have deleted, making the set inconsistent with itself, 
and by that forcing unwanted alterations upon the set in question.    
 When the self emerges from informational separateness or disconnectedness, the 
capacity to separate/disconnect or detach information from the world is a precondition for 
autonomy, since, without it, there would be no selves or personhoods, neither in form of 
autonomy or any other valued human attribute. Informational privacy is thus not valuable 
because we are autonomous, or because of any other valued human attribute, but these human 
attributes are possible because we are “informationally” detached or separated/disconnected 
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from the external environment, i.e. because we have informational privacy. Without 
informational privacy or informational detachment we cannot be a unity of information. 
When the external environment becomes a digital informational environment, the detachment 
or unity of our selves as sets of information, is not obvious. By this, informational privacy 
rights are the protection of the unity of the informational person. That is, the right to 
informational privacy is the right to informational integrity of the core or nucleus 
information, encapsulated in the consciousness membrane; together with the right to 
informational integrity of the core or nucleus information encapsulated within the corporeal 
and cognitive membrane that can, by improper external manipulations and distribution, 
disrupt the unity of the self-set. Instead of making a normative distinction between the 
“natural”51 person and her information, to the effect of having to take a roundabout way of 
ascribing moral value to personal information via the former, it seems proper to ground 
informational privacy rights on a concept of the person that can provide a direct value of 
personal information when such a conception is available. 
 
 
4.5 Some Objections to Basing Informational Privacy 
Rights on the Informational Person 
An objection against the informational re-conceptualization of personhood that could be 
raised by Benn and Rössler is, that by changing the premise of personhood one is deflating 
the subject in that the person is no longer primarily a conscious autonomous mind but a 
system, to the effect of not providing a clear conception of the informational right holder. The 
problem being, that treating persons purely as computational systems, the person will become 
a purely formal notion. That is, “[…] where one draws the line around the physical region 
that is being represented computationally is left entirely to the discretion of whoever is 
constructing the computational representation” (Millgram, n.d.). An informational conception 
of personhood where the person is equated with a set of information and informational 
processes, i.e. an informational system, does not provide for a clear-cut definition of what is 
to count as ‘the person’ in that the person can be extended to include anything or indeed 
everything. In other words if the person is a self-unifying set of information there is nothing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 ‘Natural’ here meaning autonomous as in terms of Benn (1988) or Rössler (2005).  
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stopping the person from including more or less random objects, such as a piece of land, as 
part of her system. Nucleus information of the land is thus to be considered as personal 
information of the new system and this information, as “personal” information, has a claim 
on others to treat it in accordance with obligatory informational behaviour. In my opinion, 
however, this objection arises from not recognizing the particular type of system the person is 
considered as. Zang, et al. distinguish between three kinds of systems: centralized systems, 
where the components of the system are restricted to one site; decentralized systems, where 
the components of the system are at different sites with no or limited coordination; and, 
distributed systems, where the components of the system are relatively autonomous entities 
but work together to achieve some overall objective (Zang, et al., 2004). The person as a 
multi-agent system is, as argued in Chapter 3, to be considered a distributed system, the 
overall objective of the system being that of maintaining stability of the system as a whole. If 
the person as a multi-agent system is to be extended to include additional, externally 
encapsulated, sets of information and informational processes than those included in the 
originate system; such external informational objects must satisfy the condition of 
coordination required for a distributed system. That is, if the person or multi-agent system is 
to be successfully extended to include, for instance, a piece of land, the piece of land must be 
working together with the other agents included in the system, sharing processing powers 
with them, and the originate agents included in the person as multi-agent system together 
with the piece of land in question must appear as a unity. Informational objects or agents 
included in the multi-agent system can thus only extend to those agents that can show a 
homeostatic function or contribution in relation to the whole system of which it is claimed to 
be a part. This, however, still leaves the informational conception of personhood flexible 
enough to extend the person or multi-agent system to external informational processing units 
such as smart devices etc. and so moral status could be extended to such devices, turning the 
devices in question into right holders of informational privacy rights.    
 On the other hand, it could be argued that allowing for the person being extended to 
external devices does not preserve the autonomy of the self, and that such external extension 
comes with the cost of leaving informational privacy rights unjustified. If external 
informational devices, equipped with better informational processing abilities than the 
original system, could be developed, it will be in the system’s interest to allow unlimited 
distribution and access of personal information in order to outsource information processing 
to such external processing devices. The stability of the system could be maintained more 
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sufficiently by having one’s personal information processed by external units or parties, to 
the effect of stripping the notion of autonomy of value. Extensive distribution of personal 
information is, however, in itself a de-stabling factor of the system. As mentioned in section 
4.2, the system is dependent upon optimizing its (behavioural) unity in order to maintain its 
stability. It is due to its (behavioural) unity that the system is able to resist disruptive forces. 
Such unity, however, is achieved through its degree of separation from the external 
environment. Collier states autonomy or independence as a special type of unity relation, 
“[i]ts distinguishing feature is that cohesion is maintained actively through the contributions 
of component processes to the continued existence of the system, either directly, or through 
intermediate processes” (Collier, 2002). The person i.e. multi-agent system’s degree of 
informational detachment from the world results in the unity of the system being maintained 
by the system’s self-modelling activity, that is, by the system actively creating its own self-
models. Extensive external interference to this activity jeopardizes the system’s self-
modelling abilities, in that such intrusion diminishes its internal unity relations with its parts. 
One could, for example, imagine that a system’s (i.e. person’s) body could be networked with 
external information processing units, in order for the external unit to replace activity 
originally undertaken by the shared effort of the (original) system. For instance, sensors 
detecting hunger could be placed within the system, sending information of the system’s 
energy state to an external unit, in order for the external unit to take appropriate action to 
satisfy the needs the system has relating to this state. The system would no longer depend on 
making a “hungry-model” of itself in order to satisfy its hunger, since this analysis would be 
made externally to the system. The system’s unity relation of its agents would be diminished 
in that the system’s agents need not work together in order to achieve the behavioural unity 
normally required for eating. The system becomes de-unified and needs no longer appear (to 
itself) as a unity in order to relieve its hunger, and the system, as a distributed system, is no 
longer sustained52. The multi-agent system is thus more stable by not being extensively 
interfered with by external forces, and the informational re-conceptualization of personhood 
is not incompatible with the value of autonomy, since preserving the system’s (behavioural) 
unity is (in at least some meaning of the word) due to the system being autonomous.  
 I acknowledge that an informational re-conceptualization of personhood may seem 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 This could be remedied by extending the system to include external information processing units, however, to 
the effect of forfeiting the informational integrity of the system. Extending the system to external information 
processing, by allowing extensive distribution of personal information, could leave the multi-agent system 
informationally fragmented, to the effect of there being nothing or little left of the original system.  
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rather counter-intuitive to many, and, that informational privacy rights based on the direct 
value of personal information, can make informational privacy rights seem controversially 
comprehensive. I nevertheless believe the informational re-conceptualization of personhood 
as the foundation of informational privacy rights to be appropriate (at least to be taken into 
consideration), in view of the fast and controversial changes made to our lives by the 
development in Information and Communication Technologies. In order to handle the radical 
changes these technologies make on our “world” and our place in it, we need informational 
privacy rights that are based on a conception of personhood that accommodates these 
changes.  
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5 Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have argued against the liberal accounts of Benn and Rössler, basing 
informational privacy rights on the conception of personhood in terms of autonomy. I have 
argued that the value of autonomy is not capable of securing our needs to informational 
privacy within the digital informational environment, since informational privacy rights 
based on the value of autonomy only provide us with control rights, that is, with rights to 
control others’ access to our own personal information in certain situations, and thus are not 
capable of formulating moral standards for how personal information is to be treated within a 
digital informational environment. Control rights are not sufficient in protecting individuals’ 
informational privacy rights within an environment that does not accommodate individuals’ 
ability to control their own information flow. As we find ourselves increasingly partaking in a 
digital informational environment – in which both persons (like any other entity inhabiting 
this environment) and their patterns of interaction (i.e. information flow) are created by 
computer engineers – when seeking to formulate relevant or appropriate rights to right 
holders, we should use a concept of the right holder and her abilities that matches the nature 
and the abilities of the right holder within the environment she is holding these rights in. 
 Discussion of informational privacy is frequently induced by concerns relating to 
improper manipulation of personal information within the digital informational environment. 
In this environment any entity (including persons, i.e. individual rights holders) is nothing 
other than (sets of) data or information that can be unrestrictedly operated on by information 
processing powers. An account of informational privacy rights, based on a concept of 
personhood in terms of autonomy, presupposes personal information as something separate 
from the person in question. By this, any moral status granted the person is not extended to 
her information, and any constraints on external access to personal information must be 
justified by turning to how and in which contexts such access infringes upon the person’s 
possibilities for living autonomously, personal information as such being without any moral 
value. By these theories, the moral value of the (informational) person within the digital 
informational environment becomes unclear, since, within the informational environment, a 
person is personal information. This is problematic in view of the fact that our living 
increasingly is taking place, and is expected by others to be taking place, within this 
environment. Within the digital informational environment, to provide adequate protection of 
the person’s informational privacy or integrity, a conception of the person as a set of 
information of a particular kind (i.e. as a set of morally relevant information) is needed in 
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order to justify moral constraints on behaviour towards personal information.   
 In this thesis I have claimed that such a conception is available through Floridi’s 
(2011) account of the informational person. I have suggested that, on this account, the person 
can be conceptualized in terms of a self-modelling multi-agent system, maintained by the 
agents’ capacity to encapsulate or unify information to the effect of preserving the agent’s or 
system’s stability. I have argued that the self-modelling multi-agent system is optimizing its 
overall stability by being self-unifying in its model-making, that is, the system is constructing 
its self-models by observing and interpreting its own data-structures (and information) to the 
effect of ending up with a model of itself. The moral value of personal information is the 
value, in relation to a self-modelling multi-agent system, in being constitutive of its models 
(i.e. its self). Since, however, the system does not have direct access to its own data-
structures, there can be many and various and equally appropriate interpretations of the same 
system, both by internal and external analysis to the effect of a multitude of various models. 
The informational person being the sum of all appropriate models of its system. Thus, by 
collecting someone’s personal information one is at the same time adding to the sum of 
models and by that also altering the informational person in question, this person running the 
risk of a de-stabilizing informational fragmentation. By this, when collecting or manipulating 
elements of a set of personal information, one is at the same time altering the informational 
person in question. Thus, by treating personal information one is treating the person herself, 
and personal information is entitled the moral commitment or respect of others. By realizing 
that the person can be conceptualized in terms of information, the direct value of personal 
information is recognized and the “real” harm in violations of informational privacy can be 
articulated as improper manipulations of the informational person herself. By this, 
informational privacy rights in form of obligatory constraint on behaviour towards personal 
information can be established.         
 The aim of this thesis has been to suggest or promote a moral foundation for 
informational privacy rights that reflects challenges to informational privacy of the 
individual, materialized through developments in Information and Communication 
Technologies. I have concluded that rights to informational privacy that provide sufficient 
protection to the individual is achieved only by an account of informational privacy rights 
that recognizes the informational nature of the person, and thus ascribes moral status to 
personal information, through which moral duties towards personal information can be 
defined or developed. I have not, however, given a definition of what obligations such duties 
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might involve. Defining both informational duties, or obligations, we might have towards our 
own personal information, and informational duties we owe others, must, then, be the task of 
future work.           
 While recognizing and appreciating the extensive and controversial moral, legislative, 
and political implications implicit in grounding informational privacy rights on an 
informational conception of personhood; in my view, considering the extensive (and 
controversial) implications of the information revolution to our lives, we must, just as we 
embrace technological advances, also be open to conceptual developments – even if such 
developments may affect other established liberties – in order to be equipped to deal with the 
challenges thrown at us when living in a radically technologically advanced world.    
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